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PUBLIC OFFCIALS REPRESENT ACRES, NOT PEOPLE:
SALYER LAND CO. v. TULARE LAKE BASIN
WATER STORAGE DISTRICT'
In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
special-purpose district voting scheme2 that disenfranchised nonland-
owning residents of the district and granted each landowner one vote
for each $100 of assessed land value.' The majority opinion de-
livered by Justice Rehnquist, and joined in by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, is the most recent
development in a long series of cases that have attempted to ascertain
the exact limits and contours of the voter equality principles as they
apply to units of local government.4 While certainly not conclusive
1. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
2. Special districts have been a part of American governmental structure since the
early 1800's. ADvisoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Thr PROB-
LEM OF SPECIAL DISTmRCrs IN AMERIcAN GOVERNMENT 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
ADvIsoRY COMMISSION REPORT]. The purposes and functions of a special district are
defined as follows:
[Special districts] are organized entities, possessing a structural form, an official
name, perpetual succession, and the rights to sue and be sued, to make contracts,
and to obtain and dispose of property. They have officers who are popularly
elected or are chosen by other public officials. They have a high degree of public
accountability. Moreover, they have considerable fiscal and administrative inde-
pendence from other governments. The financial and administrative criteria dis-
tiguish special districts and other governments from all dependent or subordinate
districts and from authorities which, lacking one or both of these standards, are
not governmental units... . Unlike most other governments, individual special
districts usually provide only one or a few functions.
J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRcr GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1957) [here-
inafter cited as BOLLENS]. See generally Makielski, The Special District Problem in
Virginia, 55 VA. L. REv. 1182 (1969); Mitchell, The Use of Special Districts in Fi-
nancing and Facilitating Urban Growth, 5 URBAN LAw. 185 (1973); Novak, Legal
Classification of Special District Corporate Forms in Colorado, 45 DENVER L.. 347
(1968). School districts, while admittedly "special," are classified separately.
3. 410 U.S. at 724-25.
4. See, e.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,
399 U.S. 204 (1970); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist, 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). Voter equality at the
local level has engendered much controversy and commentary. See, e.g., Dixon, Local
Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment Options, 36 GEo. WASH L.
REv. 693 (1968); Gaines, The Right of Non-Property Owners to Participate in a Special
Assessment Majority Protest, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 201 (1972); Grant & McArthur,
"One Man-One Vote" and County Government: Rural, Urban and Metropolitan Im-
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on the subject, Salyer appears to call a halt to the ongoing extension
of these principles to additional local governmental units.5
I. VOTER EQUALITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
The constitutional standard by which voting restrictions in state and
local elections must be judged is the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.6 When a statutory classification is challenged as
being violative of equal protection, courts generally articulate their con-
clusions in accordance with one of the two "accepted" standards of re-
view.7 Under the "traditional" standard, such a classification will be
sustained if it bears "some rational relationship to a legitimate state
[purpose]." 8 The second or "strict" standard will be employed if the
classification is identified as "suspect" or found to infringe upon a "fund-
plications, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 760 (1968); Hagensick, "One Man-One Vote" and
County Government, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 778 (1968); Martin, The Supreme Court
and Local Reapportionment: the Third Phase, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 102 (1970);
Martin, The Constitutional Status of Local Government Reapportionment, 6 VAL. U.L.
REv. 237 (1972); Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 21 (1965);
Comment, One Man-One Vote and ludicial Selection, 50 NEB. L. REv. 642 (1971);
Comment, The Impact of Voter Equality on the Representational Structures of Local
Government, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 639 (1972); Comment, Annexation Elections and
the Right to Vote, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1093 (1973).
5. See notes 243-53 infra and accompanying text.
6. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
7. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-44 (1973);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142
(1972); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806-07 (1969); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Gunther, Tire
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Gunther]; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
8. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); cf.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). Under the traditional standard,
broad latitude is given to the state:
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26. See, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356
(1973); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61 (1911).
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amental interest."9 If this standard is found to be applicable, a "com-
pelling state interest" in the classification must be demonstrated before
the statute will be sustained. 10
The two most common forms of voting impairments that have been
attacked on equal protection grounds are the superficially similar prob-
9. Before the strict test will be applied there must be a suspect classification or a
fundamental interest involved. Suspect classifications include those based on race,
color, religion, or alienage. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948). Fundamental
interests have been said to include the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); the right to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the
right to move from state to state, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and
the right to vote, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Where voting rights are
concerned, this strict test will apply whenever the state action "touches upon" or bur-
dens the right to vote in a normal governmental election. Thus, the strict test is applied
where the right to vote has been denied, City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); where it has been diluted, Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); or where it has been conditioned upon the payment of a fee, Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
There is a wide division between the traditional and strict standards of review:
Some situations evoked the aggressive "new" equal protection, with scrutiny that
was "strict" in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential "old"
equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact.
Gunther, supra note 7, at 8 (footnote omitted). The rigidity of this two-tier classifi-
cation has come under increasing criticism. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Professor Gunther sees
the Court developing a "newer" equal protection standard. According to Gunther,
"recent developments would view equal protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow,
preferred ground of decision in a broad range of cases." Gunther, supra note 7, at 20.
In short, it would put "new bite" into the traditional standard:
[EIxtreme deference to imaginable supporting facts and conceivable legislative pur-
poses was characteristic of the "hands off" attitude of the old equal protection.
Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagi-
nation. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes
that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it
would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on the
basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to rationali-
zations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Id. at 21. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972
Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1973).
10. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,
399 U.S. 204, 205, 209 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 627 (1969); cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
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lems of dilution and disenfranchisement."' Dilution is implicated when
government officials are elected from districts of varying population
size.12 Such a procedure conflicts with one of the basic tenets of rep-
resentative government-that "the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be
made to depend on where he lives."' 3  For in a system grounded in
representative government, it is axiomatic that a majority of the people
should elect a majority of the people's representatives.' 4
In Reynolds v. Sims, 5 the Supreme Court held that where state legis-
11. Professor Dixon argues that the courts have failed to adequately distinguish be-
tween the concepts of dilution and disenfranchisement:
In franchise cases, a [voter] has an absolute right to equality. Representation
cases are not franchise cases. But the instinctive inclination in many briefs and
opinions to treat the two as one fostered a strong tendency to import the absolute
equality principle, which is necessary as a democratic postulate in the franchise
cases, into the quite different field of representation cases ....
The essential theory of the majority in the reapportionment cases, rightly or
wrongly, was to view reapportionment disputes as simply one more round of "right
to vote" cases, i.e., franchise cases, substantially divorced from those considerations
of representation and group political dynamics which have been suggested in this
work as necessary corollaries of a "voting rights" approach to legislative appor-
tionment.
R. DIxoN, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 181, 282 (1968), quoted in Comment, Voter
Restrictions in Special Districts: A Case Study of the Salt River Project, 1969 L. &
Soc. Onjna 636, 640 n.20.
12. There can be no violation of the equal protection clause unless the individual's
vote is somehow diluted. (See notes 124-26 infra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of weighted voting schemes which can also present problems of dilution.) In
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), the Court upheld a "Seven-Four Plan" for the
reapportionment of borough councilmanic seats. Under the plan eleven councilmen were
to be elected at large. Id. at 114. Four of the members were to be elected without
regard to their residence. The other seven members were elected by all the voters, but
each had to reside in one of the seven boroughs which were of substantially unequal
size. Id. The Court upheld the plan because each councilman was a representative
of the entire city, not just the borough in which he resided. Id. at 115.
Also, the principle of "one person, one vote" does not apply to judicial elections
since judges do not act in a representative capacity. McKay, Reapportionment and
Local Government, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 713, 733 (1968). See, e.g., Wells v. Ed-
wards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), affd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973); Hols-
houser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.N.C. 1971), affd mem., 409 U.S. 807 (1972);
New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S.
3 (1966); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Ga. 1964).
13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). See generally R. DIXON, DEMO-
CRATIC REPREsENTAToI: REAPPoRTioNmNT IN LAw AND POLITICS (1968); R. McKAY,
REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAw AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1965); RE-
APPoRTIoNmENT IN ThE 1970's (N. Polsky ed. 1971); REPESMENTATION (J. Pennock
& J. Chapman eds. 1968); REPRESENTATION AND MisRPRSENTAToN: LEGISLATIVE RE-
APPORTIONmNT IN THEORY AND PRACCE (R. Goldwin ed. 1968).
14. 377 U.S. at 565.
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme
;ourt upheld the right to qhallengd the constitutionality of a Tennessee legislative ap-
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lative districts are concerned,"0 the equal protection clause commands
"'one person, one vote": -7
We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legis-
lature must be apportioned on a population basis.'8
Although the Reynolds Court indicated that some divergences from a
strict population standard were permissible, 19 it explained that popula-
tion must be the "controlling consideration."20  Therefore, no state
justification, however compelling, could defeat its application. Two
problems, however, were left for subsequent judicial resolution. Since
Reynolds only applied to state legislatures, it was unclear as to which
other types of elective bodies the utilization of population as a "con-
trolling consideration" in the distribution of the franchise was required,
2 '
and even if this requirement were found to be applicable, it was also
unclear as to which divergencies from the population standard could
survive constitutional challenge. 2
While dilution involves the dimunition of the weight of a person's
vote, disenfranchisement involves the discriminatory denial of the fran-
chise to certain otherwise qualified individuals.28 Until recently, the
Supreme Court upheld restrictions on the exercise of the franchise if
portionment plan. Prior to that time the Court avoided any judicial interference with
state apportionment plans on the ground that they involved a "political question" and,
therefore, were not justiciable. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). In Reynolds, the Court enunciated the principle
of "one person, one vote" as the standard with which to evaluate state legislative ap-
portionment plans.
16. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court dealt with the problem
of congressional district malapportionment. There, the concern was not with the equal
protection clause but with article one:
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2,
that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" means that as
nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth
as much as another's.
Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
17. The phrase "one person, one vote" apparently originated in Justice Douglas' ma-
jority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), wherein he stated:
The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lin-
coln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
ments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.
Id. at 381.
18. 377 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 579-81.
20. Id. at 581.
21. See notes 28-60 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 248-53 infra and accompanying text.
23. See note 73 infra.
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they were reasonably related to a valid state purpose.2 4  But with the
development of the strict standard of review, voting schemes by which
a state granted the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite
age and citizenship and denied the franchise to others have been unable
to meet the required test,25 i.e., the restriction was necessary to promote
the state's articulated goal and that there was a "compelling state in-
terest" for the restriction. Prior to Salyer, it was thought that this
close judicial examination was necessitated in any election of a public
official.
27
A. Dilution
Sailors v. Board of Education2 was the first local government reap-
portionment case to be decided on the merits by the United States Su-
preme Court.29 Under attack was a system by which members of a
county school board were selected by a group composed of delegates
from local boards. Since each local board sent only one delegate and
since each represented a different number of voters, it was contended
that their equal vote at the meeting was antithetical to the principle
of "one person, one vote." 0
The statutory powers of the county school board, although limited,
included the power to appoint a county school superintendent, to pre-
pare an annual budget, and to levy taxes.8 1 Justice Douglas, writing
24. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51
(1959); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302
U.S. 277, 283 (1937); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904); Mason v. Missouri,
179 U.S. 328, 335 (1900); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346 (1890).
25. See, e.g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 522 (1973); Dunn v. Blurnstein, 405
U.S. 330, 356-57 (1972); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1970);
Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419; 426 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701, 704 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). See also Hebert v. Police Jury, 245 So. 2d 349 (La.), rev'd
mem., 404 U.S. 807 (1971); Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1181
(E.D. La.), af 'd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970). But see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 758 (1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement
Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 744-45 (1973); Bums v. Forston, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Martson
v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680-81 (1973); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802, 810 (1969).
26. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 186-88 infra and accompanying text.
28. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
29. In Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), the Court dismissed two local govern-
ment reapportionment cases on jurisdictional grounds. In Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S.
112 (1967), the Court determined that there was no voter dilution and thus failed to
reach the issue. See note 12 supra.
30. 387 U.S. at 106-07.
31. Id. at 110 n.7.
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for a unanimous Court,32 held that the principles of Reynolds were in-
applicable to the county board since the method of selecting its govern-
ing body was "basically appointive rather than elective ' 3 and since its
functions were attributes of an administrative rather than of a legislative
body. 4  While the elective-appointive distinction is still accepted, 35 the
legislative-administrative distinction was shortly discarded. 6
In Avery v. Midland County,37 the Court for the first time invali-
dated a local government voting scheme on the ground that it contra-
vened the principles of "one person, one vote."38  The entity involved
was the Midland County Commissioners Court which was the govern-
ing body of the county. It consisted of five members-a county judge,
elected at large from the entire county, and four commissioners, each
elected from one of four districts within the county.39 The unequal
apportionment of the four districts was the basis of the constitutional
challenge.40
The Court, examining the legislative-administrative dichotomy set
forth in Sailors, determined that the Midland County Commissioners
Court could not "easily be classified in the neat categories favored by
civics texts" 41 because it exercised various functions that could have been
denominated as legislative, administrative, or judicial.42  Thus the
Court was led to discard the legislative-administrative distinction,43 and,
adopting a new test, stated that the Constitution "permits no substantial
variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local
government having general governmental powers over the entire geo-
32. Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result without opinion.
33. 387 U.S. at 109.
34. Id. at 110.
35. See note 244 infra.
36. See text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
37. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
38. Prior to Avery, the highest courts in a number of states had held that the prin-
ciples of Reynolds applied to units of local government. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of
Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1965); Montgomery
County Council v. Garrot, 222 A.2d 164 (Md. 1964); Hanlon v. Towey, 142 N.W.2d
741 (Minn. 1966); Bailey v. Jones, 139 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1966). Contra, Brouwer
v. Bronkema, 141 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. 1966); Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d
422 (Tex. 1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
39. 390 U.S. at 476.
40. The estimated population of the four districts was 67,906; 852; 414; and 828.
This substantial imbalance resulted by placing the county's only urban center entirely
within one of the districts. Id. As a result, 2.9% of the county's residents elected a
majority of the commissioners court.
41. Id. at 482.
42. Id.
43. Id. Accord, Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 55-56 (1970).
1974]
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graphic area served by the body."" Applying this test to the county
commissioners court, the Court determined that it had the authority
"to make a large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts on
all the citizens of the county"'45 and, thus, the principles of "one per-
son, one vote" were applicable.
46
The decision in Avery invited speculation as to the applicability
of "one person, one vote" to other local government units, especially
special-purpose districts. While it was clear that cities, towns, and
counties met the test,47 the opinion's explicit language indicated that
some government entities might not:
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government
assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of con-
stituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the
question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give
greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization's
functions. 48
The amorphous character of the test, arising from the difficulty in de-
termining when an entity exercised "general governmental powers," was
an additional source of confusion.
The Supreme Court's next opportunity to clarify the situation was
presented in Hadley v. Junior College District,49 where the principle
of Avery was extended to include school districts. Under attack was
a method of allocating trustees for a junior college district that allegedly
resulted in malapportionment. 0 Determining that education was a "vi-
44. 390 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 483. The Court determined that the commissioners had the power to ex-
ercise a wide range of governmental functions. They could maintain buildings, admin-
ister welfare, and make determinations concerning school districts. It also had the
power to set a tax rate, equalize assessments, and issue bonds. The Court ignored the
finding of the Texas Supreme Court that the powers exercised by the entity were "negligi-
ble." Id. The Texas court had found that historical development had limited the ac-
tivities of the commissioners court to the non-urban areas of the county. Avery v. Mid-
land County, 406 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex. 1966). The Court, however, was concerned
not with the activities of the commissioners court, but with the powers they could po-
tentially exercise.
46. 390 U.S. at 484-85.
47. Id. at 481.
48. Id. at 483-84.
49. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
50. Under Missouri law, separate school districts could establish by referendum a con-
solidated junior college district and elect six trustees to conduct the business of the
district. The trustees of the district were apportioned among the separate school dis-
tricts on the basis of "school enumeration," i.e., the number of persons between the
ages of six and twenty. Using school enumeration rather than district residents as the
basis in which to apportion the trustees resulted in a claim of unequal representation.
[Vol. 7
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tal governmental function,"51 the Court concluded that the powers of
the district52 were "general enough and [had] sufficient impact
throughout the district ' 53 to support an application of the principles
explicated in Avery. 4 The Court, however, was clearly unsatisfied
with the analytical approach demanded by Avery and squarely recog-
nized the difficulty of developing "judicially manageable standards"
with which to distinguish between agencies which exercise general gov-
ernmental powers and those which do not.5 5  Instead, a presumption
was adopted that "one person, one vote" applied whenever government
officials were selected by popular election. 6 The only suggested qual-
ification of this presumption was offered in the most tentative of terms:
It is of course possible that there might be some case in which a state
elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from nor-
mal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different
groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds . . .might
not be required. .... 57
Thus with the exception of a weak disclaimer buried in the Hadley
decision, the pre-Salyer interpretive context suggested that population
was to be the "controlling consideration" in the election of every public
official in the United States.5 8  While the Court did not demand mathe-
matical exactness,59 it clearly required that state schemes which con-
The Kansas City district, which contained 60% of the consolidated junior college dis-
trict's population, elected only three of the six trustees. Id. at 51.
51. Id. at56.
52. The powers of the district's trustees included the levy and collection of taxes,
issuance of bonds, hiring and firing of teachers, making of contracts, collection of fees,
supervision and disciplining of students, passing on petitions to annex school districts,
acquisition of property by condemnation, and the overall management of the district.
Id. at 53.
53. Id. at 54.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 55.
56. Id. at 56. The Court stated this presumption as follows:
[A]s a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to select persons
by popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an
equal opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an elected
body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a basis
that will insure, as far as practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for
proportionally equal numbers of officials.
Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added). Compare the approach of Avery, quoted in text ac-
companying note 51 supra.
58. 397 U.S. at 56.
59. One of the most recent and least discussed of the voter equality cases dealing
with local government is Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). In Abate, the Court
approved a reapportionment plan for a county board of supervisors which resulted in
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tributed to the dilution of a person's vote were contrary to the basic
principles of representative government.60
B. Disenfranchisement
In Kramer v. Union Free School District,1 Cipriano v. City of
Houma,62 and City of Phoenix v. Kolodzieski, 63 the Supreme Court
had occasion to deal with various voting schemes that attempted to re-
strict the franchise to those "primarily interested in the outcome of the
elections involved." ' In each case, the Court invalidated the statutory
scheme. Kramer involved franchise restrictions in a New York school
district election. To be eligible to vote in district elections 5 an other-
wise qualified district resident had to meet one of the following addi-
a total deviation from population equality of 11.9%. Id. at 184. For over 100 years
the county had been governed by a board of supervisors consisting of the supervisors
of the county's five constituent towns, but population growth had resulted in substantial
malapportionment. Id. at 183. In order to preserve the close cooperation between the
five towns and the county, a reapportionment plan was submitted that proposed the
creation of an eighteen member county legislature elected from five districts that cor-
responded exactly to the boundaries of the five towns. Each district was assigned legis-
lators in the proportion of its population to that of the smallest district. id. at 184.
While adhering to the principle of careful judicial scrutiny, the Court noted that de-
partures from strict equality may sometimes be permissible when based on the peculiar
needs and circumstances of the local community. Id. at 185. The Court then went
on to approve the plan based upon "the long tradition of overlapping functions and
dual personnel in ... [the] [c]ounty government and on the fact that the plan ...
[did] not contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geo-
graphic areas." Id. at 187.
While the Court made reference to "departures from strict equality," it should be
noted that the concept of "strict equality" has never been defined with respect to state
and local reapportionment. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), and
Welles v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969), the Court defined the term "strict equal-
ity" as it applied to congressional redistricting:
[T]he command of Art. I, § 2, that States create congressional districts which pro-
vide equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve
absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.
394 U.S. at 531. See, e.g., 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 152 (1969); 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 637
(1969); 15 VmL. L. Rv. 223 (1969). This notion of "mathematical exactness" has
never been applied by the Court to state legislative districts. See notes 248-53 infra
and accompanying text.
60. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
61. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
62. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
63. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
64. See note 73 infra.
65. New York law provides that school boards in districts which are primarily rural
or suburban may be selected at an annual meeting of the qualified school voters. N.Y.
Enuc. LAw § 2012 (McKinney Supp. 1972). This was the method used by the Union
Free School District to select its governing body. 395 U.S. at 622-23.
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tional requirements: (1) be an owner or lessee of taxable real property
located within the district; (2) be a spouse of such a person; or (3)
be a parent or guardian of a child enrolled in a district school.6" The
sole issue for resolution by the Court was whether or not this scheme
violated the equal protection clause. 67  The Court, utilizing the strict
standard of review,68 determined that it did.69
The district had argued that the state had a legitimate interest in limit-
ing the district's elections to those "primarily interested" in school af-
fairs."0 The Court held that even if such a purpose were considered
to be constitutionally legitimate, the statute's system of classification was
not precisely tailored to accomplish it."1 The classification was over-
inclusive in that it included many persons tangentially interested in
school affairs and under-inclusive in that it excluded many persons with
a substantial interest in decisions affecting education, e.g., teachers. 2
In Cipriano, the Court, in a per curiam opinion, applied the princi-
ples of Kramer to a revenue bond election called to finance the opera-
tions of a city's utility system. Under Louisiana law only property own-
ers were permitted to vote in such an election."3  It was the city's con-
66. 395 U.S. at 623.
67. Id. at 625. The Court was careful to note what was not at issue in the case.
No attack was made on the power of the state to impose reasonable citizenship, age,
and residency requirements as a precondition to the exercise of the franchise. Only
the additional requirements were of concern to the Court. See note 73 infra.
68. 395 U.S. at 626. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text. Of significant
importance in its application of the strict standard was the Court's focus of attention
on the denial of the franchise, rather than the purpose of the election:
Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs
which substantially affect their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute
grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship
and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions
are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
395 U.S. at 626-27 (footnotes omitted). The Court further stated that the need for
strict scrutiny would be undiminished simply because under a different statutory scheme
the office could have been filled by appointment rather than by an election. Id. at
628-29. Nor did the type of governmental powers exercised by the entity change the
need for the strict test. Id. at 629. See text accompanying notes 186-88 infra.
69. 395 U.S. at 632.
70. Id. at 630-31.
71. Id. at 632. If the Court had decided that the classification accomplished the
state's articulated goal, it would then have had to determine whether or not "the interest
promoted by limiting the franchise constitute[d] a compelling state interest." Id. at 632
n.14.
72. Id. at 632 (footnote omitted).
73. 395 U.S. at 702. Historically, the ownership of property or the payment of taxes
was related to voter competency. J. PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION IN AMFmCA 175 (1960). While today a state has the power to impose reason-
able requirements and qualifications to promote intelligent or responsible voting (see,
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tention that property owners held a "'special pecuniary interest' in the
election, because the efficiency of the utility system directly affect[ed]
'property and property values' and thus 'the basic security of their
investment in [their] property [was] at stake.' ,,74 Again, without de-
ciding whether or not the franchise could be restricted to those "primar-
ily interested," the Court determined that the statutory scheme did not
fulfill the state's articulated goal since those excluded had as much
interest in the outcome of the election as those the statute included.
7
1
This conclusion was based on the fact that both property owners and
nonproperty owners used the services of the utility, paid for its opera-
tions, and benefited by the projects financed by its revenues. 70
The question posed in Kolodziejski was whether or not the limitation of
the franchise to property owners in a city's general obligation bond elec-
tion violated the equal protection clause.7" In substance, the city con-
tended that property owners were more "interested" in such elections
for two reasons. First, by statute, property -taxes were required to be
levied in an amount sufficient to service the bonds.78 Second, the
bonds were in effect a lien on the real property since they were secured
by the city's general taxing power.79 Therefore, the city argued that
the state was justified in recognizing the "unique interests" of property
owners by excluding others from participation in bond elections.8 0
While acknowledging that the interests of property owners were
e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904)), the notion
that property ownership or the payment of taxes promotes the intelligent use of the
ballot is unjustified. There is no relation between property ownership or the payment
of taxes and voter competency. Thus, the restriction of the ballot to property owners
or taxpayers is not a reasonable requirement to promote intelligent voting. See Turner
v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1970); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 666 (1966). Therefore, the only reason that can be asserted to support such a
restriction is that it separates persons with a substantial interest in the outcome of the
election from those with little or no interest. See Comment, Ownership of Land as
a Prerequisite to the Right to Vote: Equal or Unequal Protection, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
594 (1969).
74. 395 U.S. at 704.
75. Id. at 706.
76. Id. The Court stated:
Property owners, like nonproperty owners, use the utilities and pay the rates; how-
ever, the impact of the revenue bond issue on them is unconnected to their status
as property taxpayers. Indeed, the benefits and burdens of the bond issue fall in-
discriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner alike.
Id. at 705.
77. 399 U.S. at 205.
78. Id. at 208 (footnote omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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somewhat different from the interests of nonproperty owners, the Court
found no basis upon which to conclude that the interests of nonproperty
owners were substantially less than those included within the grant of
the franchise.81 Factors considered determinative by the Court were
that all residents of the city had an interest in the services and facili-
ties financed by the bonds and that all residents, property owners and
nonproperty owners alike, contributed to the retirement of the bonds.82
Thus, although the Kramer line of cases did not absolutely preclude
the states from confining the electorate to those persons "primarily in-
terested," it seems equally clear that state attempts to experiment with
innovative structural arrangements were greeted with suspicious consti-
tutional examination. While the Court did not arbitrarily impose any
particular structural mechanism upon the states,83 it was obviously pre-
81. Id. at 212.
82. The parties had stipulated that in the past more than half of the debt service
requirements came from taxes other than real property taxes and that nonproperty
owners as well as property owners contributed to those taxes. Id. at 209-10. The
Court went even further and stated that even if the property tax completely serviced
the bonds, the justification would still be insufficient since both landlords and commer-
cial establishments pass the taxes on to their tenants and customers as a cost of doing
business. Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that "virtually all residents share
the burden of property taxes imposed and used to service general obligation bonds."
Id. at 211.
Furthermore, the Court noted that there was no adequate state reason to justify the
restriction in light of the fact that only fourteen states had similar restrictions. Id.
at 212-13. The Court stated that the other thirty-six states -that did not have such
a restriction did not have any more difficulty issuing the bonds than those states that
did. Additionally, it noted that none of the fourteen states were shown to have special
problems that could be considered a compelling state interest for such a restriction.
Id.
83. There is no prescribed structure for local government units. The United States
Constitution makes no mention of local government. From a strict legal standpoint,
local governments are but creatures of the state:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their power and rights
wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the
right, the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corpora-
tions in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.. .. They are, so to
phrase it, the tenants at will of the legislature.
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & M.R.R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868) (Dillion, I.),
quoted in Hanson, Toward a New Urban Democracy: Metropolitan Consolidation and
Decentralization, 58 GEo. LJ. 863, 869 n.20 (1970). As a consequence, local govern-
ment units can exercise only those powers expressly authorized by the state's constitu-
tion or statutes.
While there is no inherent right to local self-government (see J. WINTrS, STATE
CONSTTrTTONAL LIMnTATIONS ON SOLUTIONS oF ME-ROoLrrA, AREA PROBLEmS 5-14
(1961)), such a right is often delegated to local government by the state through home
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pared to demand that certain constitutional prerequisites be scrupu-
lously followed: 8 4
To generalize, one can say that where an election of public officials
is undertaken, a voter may not be discriminated against so that his vote
counts less than any other, whether such discrimination is accomplished
by unequal districting, irrational limitation of the electorate, or any
other electoral scheme.
8 5
The Court had hinted that these broad ranging principles might be
subject to qualification, but prior to Salyer it had yet to determine
whether or not the proscription of Reynolds against dilution applied
to special-purpose districts, nor had it decided whether or not a state
could limit the franchise to those "primarily interested" in the outcome
of an election. The result was to invite the lower courts to strike down
a wide variety of voting schemes, and while many lower courts were
prepared to accept the invitation,88 many were not.s7
rule or other provisions. And the common provision provides for the local government
entity to resemble a "miniature republic":
Agreeing with de Tocqueville that "[a] nation may establish a free government,
but without municipal institutions it cannot have a spirit of liberty," American
civic culture envisions each town or city as a "miniature republic."
Hanson, Toward A New Urban Democracy: Metropolitan Consolidation and Decen-
tralization, supra at 870, quoting 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOcRACY IN AMERICA
61 (H. Reeve transl. 1945) and R. WOOD, SUBURBIA, ITS PEOPLE AND THEnR PoLITiCs
20-53 (1959). Although the "miniature republic" concept is the norm, there appears to
be no federal constitutional limitation on other methods of control. See note 244 infra.
84. Without such principles great abuses in the democratic process could result. A
good example is Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal. 2d 318, 384 P.2d 421, 33
Cal. Rptr. 101 (1963), wherein three of the five members of the county board of super-
visors were elected by approximately 17 per cent of the voters. See also Dundee v.
Orleans Parish Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 434 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1970) (parish
board of assessors was elected from seven districts varying in population from 34,415
to 260,510); Bowden v. Stacey, 309 F. Supp. 510, 511 (S.D. Ala. 1970) (four county
commissioners districts varied in population from 1,300 to 3,790); Freeman v. Dies, 307
F. Supp. 1028, 1030-31 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (districts for state board of education varied
from 205,409 to 1,243,158); Slater v. Board of Supervisors, 319 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634
(Sup. Ct. 1971) (eleven of the twenty-five supervisors were elected by one-fifth of the
population of the county).
85. Herget, The Impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Structure of Metro-
politan and Regional Governments, 23 HASTiNaS L.J. 763, 783 (1972).
86. See, e.g., Scott v. Lack, 332 F. Supp. 220, 222 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (offices of
county commissioners declared vacant and new elections ordered to insure equal protec-
tion); Dameron v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury, 315 F. Supp. 137, 139-41 (E.D. La.
1970) (apportionment plan of parish school board prohibited by the equal protection
clause); Bowden v. Stacey, 309 F. Supp. 510, 513 (S.D. Ala. 1970) (districts for
county commissioners that ranged in population from a low of 1,300 and high of 3,790
prohibited by the equal protection clause); West v. Moore, 305 F. Supp. 683, 688
(W.D.N.C. 1969) (malapportionment and grant of two votes to chairman of six mem-
ber county commissioners prohibited by the equal protection clause); Sebesta v. Miklas,
272 So. 2d 141, 146-47 (Fla. 1972) (20.5% maximum variation between districts of uni-
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fied county council prohibited by equal protection clause); Stanley v. Southwestern
Community College Merged Area, 184 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 1971) (districts for school
district contrary to "one person, one vote" but board allowed to continue to function
for reasonable period of time); In re Apportionment of Ionia County Bd. of Comm'rs,
198 N.W.2d 2, 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (diversity of urban and rural interests not
a proper justification for deviations from equal population); State ex rel. Pagni v.
Brown, 497 P.2d 1364, 1366-67 (Nev. 1972) (apportionment plan for county commis-
sioners that required commissioners to be elected from various areas of the county vio-
lated "one person, one vote"); Slater v. Board of Supervisors, 319 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634
(Sup. Ct. 1971) ("one person, one vote" violated by a scheme in which towns with
one-fifth of the population elected eleven of the twenty-one supervisors).
87. See, e.g., LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743, 748-51 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem.,
409 U.S. 972 (1972) (minority election scheme for school board did not violate the
equal protection clause); Mayes v. Teague, 341 F. Supp. 254, 255-56 (E.D. Tenn.
1972) ("one person, one vote" not violated when seven members of the school board
were elected at large even though members were required to live in districts of varying
population sizes); Obermiller v. Siegel, 340 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D. Neb. 1972) (equal
protection clause not violated when districting for county supervisors did not consider
"likeness of interest among the people of each geographical election district"); Pate
v. El Paso County, 337 F. Supp. 95, 100 (W.D. Tex.), afl'd mem., 400 U.S. 806
(1970) (staggered terms for county commissioners not a violation of equal protection
clause); Grisbaum v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 267, 275 (E.D. La. 1971) (maximum
population variance of 5.9% for parish council not impermissible); Kaelin v. Warden,
334 F. Supp. 602, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (limited voting scheme that permitted each
voter to vote for two of three commissioners of county not a violation of "one person,
one vote"); Rutledge v. State, 330 F. Supp. 336, 339-41 (W.D. La. 1971) (equal pro-
tection not denied when electors of parish board included residents of city that had
separate school system); Kollar v. City of Tucson, 319 F. Supp. 482, 483-85 (D.
Ariz. 1970), aff'd mem., 402 U.S. 967 (1971) (residency within municipal boundary
a valid restriction on the right to vote in municipal water bond election); Blanco v.
Gangloff, 265 A.2d 502, 506-07 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970) (minority representation stat-
ute for selecting board of an administrative body not a violation of "one person, one
vote"); District Bd. of Health v. Chancey, 500 P.2d 845, 849 (Idaho 1972) (budget
committee of public health district that consisted of representatives of boards of county
commissioners within the boundaries of district not a violation of "one person, one
vote"); People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Caliendo, 277 N.E.2d 319, 325 (Ill.), appeal dis-
missed, 406 U.S. 965 (1972) (no requirement that the authorities for urban transporta-
tion district be elected rather than appointed); Cohen v. Hoye, 280 A.2d 778, 783 (Me.
1971) ("one person, one vote" held inapplicable to school district because of lack of
systematic built-in discrimination); Waters v. Putnam, 183 N.W.2d 545, 550-51 (Minn.
1971) (apportionment of board of managers of watershed district not prohibited by
equal protection); Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. State, 270 A.2d 418, 441 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 304 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1973) ("one person, one
vote" inapplicable to municipal committee comprised of the mayors of the constituent
municipalities that varied in population sizes); Smith v. Common Council, 321 N.Y.S.2d
803 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (apportionment plan for common council of city not contrary to
"one person, one vote" when ten wards varied in sizes from a low of 1,202 to a high
of 1,232); Community College v. School Dist., 287 A.2d 844, 846-47 (Pa. Comm. Ct.
1972) (appointive scheme for community college district not prohibited by "one person,
one vote"); Hedrick v. County Court, 172 S.E.2d 312, 314 (W. Va. 1970) (appointive
scheme for board of directors of public library not prohibited by the equal protection
clause).
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II. SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA: PRELUDE TO Salyer
California has created a number of special districts that employ vot-
ing schemes restricting the franchise to landowners.8 Often concomit-
ant with this restriction is a system of weighted voting8 that gives each
landowner votes in proportion to the value of his land holdings.90
These districts, some of the earliest established government entities in
the state,91 perform relatively limited functions92 and, therefore, present
an ideal context in which to test the outer reaches of the dual issues
of dilution and disenfranchisement.93
Prior to the decision in Salyer, there had been no conclusive resolu-
88. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE ANN. § 9140 (West 1956) (resource conser-
vation districts); CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 34027 (West 1956) (California Water
Districts); id. § 41000 (West 1966) (water storage districts); id. § 50016 (West
Supp. 1974) (reclamation districts); id. § 70121 (West 1966) (levee districts); CAL.
WATER CODE App. § 1-5 (West 1968) (Levee District No. 1); id. § 2-1 (Swamp Land
District No. 150); id. § 3-3 (Reclamation District No. 317); id. § 4-3 (protection dis-
tricts); id. § 21-2 (Knights Landing Drainage District); id. § 106-7 (Brannan-Andrus
Levee Maintenance District); id. § 115-1.3 (West Supp. 1974) (North Delta Water
Agency). See BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 250.
89. The weighted voting schemes hereinafter discussed refer to systems whereby
voting power is proportionately distributed in relation to the amount of land the voter
owns. There is another type of weighted voting device that has been given some con-
sideration as a method of producing voter equality in state legislative apportionment
plans. Instead of equalizing district populations by redistricting, each legislator would
be allowed to cast a number of votes in proportion to the number of people he or
she represented. See, e.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), affd per curiam, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated as moot, 384 U.S. 887 (1966);
Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Wash.), a!f'd in part per curiam, 378
U.S. 554 (1964). See generally Banzhaf, One Man, ? Votes: Mathematical Analysis
of Voting Power and Effective Representation, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. Rnv. 808 (1968);
Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RtrroEES L.
REv. 317 (1965); Comment, Equal Representation and the Weighted Voting Alterna-
tive, 79 YALE L.. 311 (1969).
90. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 35003 (West Supp. 1974) (California
Water Districts); id. § 41001 (West 1966) (water storage districts); id. § 50704
(West Supp. 1974) (reclamation districts); CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 3-5 (West
1968) (Reclamation District No. 317); id. § 4-3 (protection districts); id. § 21-2
(Knights Landing Drainage District); id. § 106-7 (Brannan-Andrus Levee Maintenance
District); id. § 115-2.2 (West Supp. 1974) (North Delta Water Agency). See BOLLENS,
supra note 2, at 250.
91. See, e.g., ch. 349, § 1, [1874] Cal. Stat. 511 (Levee District No. 1); ch. 629,
§ 1, [1874] Cal. Stat. 867 (Swamp Land District No. 150); ch. 379, § 1, [1878] Cal.
Stat. 562 (Reclamation District No. 317); ch. 63, § 1, [1880] Cal. Stat. 55 (protection
districts).
92. See AssEMLLy INTERIm CoMMrrEE ON MucIPAL AND COUNTY GOVERN-
MNT, ANALYsIs OF CAIFORNu Dis-mn r LAws (1965). See notes 240-42 infra and
accompanying text.
93. See notes 28-87 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of the propriety of these voting schemes. The first California case
to deal with the validity of one of these schemes, in light of the voter
equality cases, 94 was Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation-District.0 5 The
district, which was formed to deal with the problems of flood control
and irrigation in the Palo Verde Valley,96 was financed solely from as-
sessments made against landowners9 7 and was invested with the govern-
mental powers necessary to carry out its relatively circumscribed func-
tions. 8 The Schindler court was faced with the validity of the statutory
formula that gave each landowner one vote for each $100 of assessed
land value.99 Although the voting scheme also restricted the franchise
to landowners,100 that issue was not properly before the court.101
94. Earlier challenges to the validity of many of these voting schemes in light
of California constitutional provisions had been previously resolved. See note 242
infra.
95. 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969). See also Lake Howel Water
& Reclamation Dist. v. State, 268 So. 2d 897, 899-901 (Fla. 1972), wherein the court
held that the voting scheme of a drainage district which restricted the franchise to land-
owners and weighted the vote did not violate the equal protection clause.
96. The Palo Verde Irrigation District was formed by special act of the legisla-
ture in 1923. CAL. WATER CODE App. § 33-1 et seq. (West 1968). The district was
formed to protect the land within its boundaries from flood and overflow (Id. § 33-
14) and to construct dams, reservoirs, and works for the collection of water for the
district, and to do everything necessary to furnish sufficient water for irrigation and
domestic purposes (id. § 33-10).
97. Id. § 33-27.
98. The district may enter into contracts; employ such agents, employees and offi-
cials as are necessary; acquire property by condemnation, purchase or lease; construct
dams, reservoirs, and irrigation works; enter upon any lands for the purpose of making
surveys (CAL. WATER CODE App. § 33-10 (West 1968) ); issue bonds (id. § 33-15);
levy assessments (id. §§ 33-25, -26); and set charges and tolls for water and proscribe
rules for its use (id. § 33-10a).
99. CAL. WATER CODE App. § 33-6 (West 1968) provides:
Any person, firm or corporation owning any real property and/or the improve-
ments thereon, or any interest in real property and/or the improvements thereon
(but not including personal property) which interest or ownership is assessed on
the last preceding equalized assessment roll of the district (and only the owners
of property so assessed) shall be entitled to vote at any election, special or gen-
eral, for the election of trustees, or for any other purpose pertaining to the affairs
of said district. Each property owner so qualified to vote shall be entitled to cast
one vote for each one hundred dollars of assessed valuation or fraction thereof
greater than fifty dollars ....
100. Id.
101. The suit was brought by a landowner of the district on behalf of himself and
other landowners challenging the weighted voting scheme on the ground that it violated
the equal protection clause. I Cal. App. 3d at 833, 82 CaL Rptr. at 61-62. Plaintiff
conceded his lack of standing to challenge that part of the voting scheme that restricted
the franchise to landowners. Id. at 835, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 63. In Barber v. Galloway,
195 Cal. 1, 231 P. 34 (1924), this provision of the voting scheme was upheld against
a challenge that it violated provisions of the California constitution. See note 242 in-
Ira.
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The court first stated that the voting scheme did not present a "one
person, one vote" issue since there was no assertion of dilution through
improper districting. 102 Rather the court defined the issue in terms
of disenfranchisement:
The precise issue before us is the validity of a statute which classifies
voters by apportioning voter influence to landowners ostensibly in pro-
portion to the degree to which they are interested in and affected by the
operation in the district .... 103
Therefore, "[a]ny disparity in the statutory grant of the franchise,
whether it be in the quantum of influence distributed among the voters
or in the total denial of franchise to some and its grant to others,"10 4
must be subjected to the strict guidelines of Kramer.'05
Having made this initial determination of the appropriate standard,
the court then proceeded directly to the question of whether there was
a compelling state interest which justified the statutory voting scheme.
In the court's opinion, the state had a compelling interest in the "recla-
mation of waste lands through flood protection, drainage and irrigation
works.' 0 6  Since the district could not have been formed unless land-
102. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 836, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
103. Id. By adopting this line of analysis the court was able to avoid decid-
ing whether or not "one person, one vote" principles applied to special-purpose
districts. In Thompson v. Board of Directors, 247 Cal. App. 2d 587, 55 Cal. Rptr. 689
(1967), the court held inapplicable the principles of "one person, one vote" to an irriga-
tion district. The court set forth the following guidelines in ascertaining whether or not
the government entity involved should be adjudged by those principles:
[If the principal purpose of a district is to provide a service or services which can
be and are sometimes provided by a private or quasi-public corporation (such as a
public utility company), and if in the accomplishment of this purpose it does
not exercise general powers of government, it is not subject to the "one man, one
vote" rule. If, however, its principal purpose is to govern or if its functions are
primarily governmental in nature, or if not governmental in nature they are ac-
complished by the exercise of general powers of government, it meets the test, and
the doctrine is applicable.
Id. at 592, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93. The court then concluded that the irrigation dis-
trict provides services which can be performed by a quasi-public corporation and that
the district did not exercise general governmental powers. Thus, the principles of "one
person, one vote" were inapplicable. Id. at 593, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
In Girth v. Thompson, 11 Cal. App. 3d 325, 89 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1970), the court,
without deciding the issue, implied that the principles of "one person, one vote" were
applicable to an irrigation district. The court, however, also stated that population was
not the only factor that had to be considered:
mhe constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law, which is the parent
of the "one man, one vote" rule, does not prohibit the state from prescribing a
standard of equality between the divisions based on land as well as population.
Id. at 329, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
104. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
105. Id.
166. Id. at 839, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66. See, e.g., People ex reL. Chapman v. Sacra-
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owners had the dominant voice in its operation, 1 7 the court determined
that the restriction of the franchise to landowners was necessary to pro-
mote the state's compelling interest.' 08 The court then concluded that
the weighting of the landowners' votes did not violate the principles of
Kramer:
[T]he benefits and burdens accrue to each landowner in proportion
to the extent of land owned, [and, therefore,] the grant of [the] fran-
chise in proportion to the assessed value of land ownership fairly dis-
tributes voting influence among those primarily and directly interested
in direct proportion to the stake each has in the District.10 9
The Schindler court seemed inextricably lost in its reasoning process.
Its first error was the curious assumption that dilution could occur only
through improper districting,10 but the court's own phrasing of the
issue before it indicates that the weighting of votes according to the
amount of land owned is a dilution question-not one of disenfran-
chisement.'" The proper analytical approach was thus to be found
in Avery, not Kramer.
But even if the Kramer analysis were the appropriate test in this con-
text, the court's approach was still incorrect, for, under the guidelines
of that case, the first question which must be resolved is whether the
voting scheme was necessary to promote the state's articulated goal, a
question the opinion did not even pose." 2  And finally, even if the
mento Drainage Dist., 155 Cal. 373, 103 P. 207 (1909). In creating the Palo Verde
Irrigation District, the California Legislature declared that the state had "a primary and
supreme interest in securing to the inhabitants and property owners ...the greatest
possible use, conservation and protection of the waters of the Colorado river ... "
CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 33-1 (West 1968).
107. In the court's opinion, the interests of those excluded were substantially less
than those included in the grant of the franchise:
The activities of the District no doubt affect the economy of the area and to that
extent District affairs may be of interest to all inhabitants irrespective of land
ownership, but such general interest, standing alone, cannot be said to constitute,
as a matter of law, a direct, primary and substantial interest entitling all inhabi-
tants to vote. Such general economic interest is indirect, not primary and substan-
tial.
1 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66. The court apparently ignored the legisla-
tive purpose in establishing the district. See note 106 supra. One of the main rea-
sons the district was established was to provide flood protection for the area, which
would seemingly affect property owners and nonproperty owners equally.
108. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
109. Id., 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67.
110. Cf. Burrey v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement Dist., 5 Cal. 3d 671, 678,
488 P.2d 395, 400, 97 Cal. Rptr. 203, 208 (1971). See Gaines, The Right of Non-
Property Owners to Participate in a Special Assessment Majority Protest, 20 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 201, 222-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gaines].
11. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
112. See notes 61-82 supra and accompanying text.
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state's interest were in fact a sufficiently compelling one to restrict the
franchise to landowners and even if it were necessary to promote the
state's articulated goal, the court offered no justification at all for the
weighting of each landowner's vote. Despite its obvious weaknesses,
the decision does illustrate a judicial willingness to acknowledge that
there are some limits to the reaches of the voter equality principles.
While the decision in Schindler gave some support for the validity
of similar voting schemes in other special districts, the question did
not reach the Supreme Court of California until the case of Burrey
v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement District.113  In Burrey, the
court was faced with a challenge to the validity of the voting scheme
of the Embarcadero Municipal Improvement District (hereinafter re-
ferred to as FMID) which both restricted -the franchise to landown-
ers11 4 and gave each landowner one vote for each dollar of assessed
land value.'15 The EMID was created by the California Legislature in
1960116 to foster municipal improvements in an uninhabited area of
the state and to serve as a catalyst in the development of a private small
craft harbor.117  To achieve these aims the EMID, which was governed
113. 5 Cal. 3d 671, 488 P.2d 395, 97 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1971).
114. Ch. 81, §§ 19-20, [19611 Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 444 (1960). Corporations
and legal representatives of landowners are also allowed to participate in district elec-
tions.
115. Ch. 81, § 64, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 447 (1960) provides, "Each
voter shall have one vote for each one dollar ($1) in assessed valuation of land owned
by him as shown by the last equalized assessment roll." As a result of the decision
in this case, this provision was amended to read: "Each voter shall have one vote."
Ch. 95, § 4, [1972] Cal. Stat. 130.
116. Ch. 81, [1961] Cal. Stat 1st Extr. Sess. 441 (1960). Beginning in 1960, the
California Legislature created a number of special districts designed to be tools in the
hands of land developers:
The continuing quest of all land speculators has been the search for new
sources of capital to finance their ventures. The California speculator has recently
discovered that he can employ special districts and other public agencies to provide
him with a significant credit subsidy. With boundary lines artfully drawn to in-
clude only the promoter's land, a special district becomes a tightly controlled oper-
ating division of the promoter's organization-an operating division which can use
its bonding powers to raise risk capital independent of the subscriber's own credit
resources or capital reserve.
Willoughby, The Quiet Alliance, 38 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 72 (1965). See ASSEmBLY IN-
TERIM COMMIITEE ON MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY GOVERNmENT, TRANSCRIPT OF PRO-
CEEDINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DisnuTRs USED IN LAND DE-
VELOPmENT SrruATIONS (1962). The EMID is just such a district. Having serious
problems since its inception, the EMID languished in bankruptcy for five years alleg-
edly as a result of the actions of the land developers who became its first directors.
Two of the district's land developer-directors were indicted by the Los Angeles County
Grand Jury on charges of criminal conspiracy to misappropriate public funds, grand
theft, and violation of corporate recording laws. See People v. Steele, 235 Cal. App.
2d 798, 45 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965).
117. 5 Cal. 3d at 674, 488 P.2d at 397, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
by a board of diretors elected 'by landowners,"" was invested with
broad governmental powers similar, in most respects, to those of a mu-
nicipality." 9 Residents of the EMI brought suit alleging that the dis-
trict's voting scheme violated the equal protection clause.2 0
The court first examined the issue of weighted voting. Since the
EMID was invested with powers characteristic of most cities,' 2 ' the court
concluded that it exercised "general governmental powers" similar to
those exercised by the government units in Avery and Hadley,22 and,
therefore, determined that the principles of "one person, one vote" were
applicable.1
23
Unlike the Schindler court, the Burrey court recognized that the right
to vote could be wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted "when the
weighted vote is based on property value as well as district apportion-
ment,"'1 24 and perceived no distinction of constitutional importance be-
tween these methods of weighting votes. 125  The court stated that the
118. Ch. 174, § 1, [19691 Cal. Stat. 424-25.
119. The EM]D is authorized to provide the major services and utilities that a city
normally supplies its residents. It is empowered to provide facilities for street and
highway lighting; collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage, industrial wastes, storm
waters, and garbage; the production, storage, treatment, and distribution of water for
public and private purposes; and drainage and reclamation. Ch. 672, § 1, [1970] Cal.
Stat. 1302. The district is authorized to operate a police department (ch. 81, § 79,
[19611 Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 447 (1960)); may make and enforce all regulations
concerning the removal of garbage and refuse, and the supplying of sewage, water,
storm water, and police protection service, a violation of which constitutes a misde-
meanor (ch. 81, § 97, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 449 (1960)); may compel all
residents and property owners to use its sewage and garbage disposal services (ch. 81,
§ 98, [19611 Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 449 (1960)); and collect charges for the services
and facilities furnished by it. It may also provide recreational facilities, including a
private small craft harbor. Ch. 672, §§ 1-2, [1970] Cal. Stat. 1302-03.
To carry out these activities the district is given a wide -range of governmental pow-
ers. The district may finance its operations by collecting tax on both real and personal
property within the district (ch. 81, § 162, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 453
(1960)) and by incurring bonded indebtedness (ch. 81, § 87, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1st
Extr. Sess. 448 (1960)). The district has the power of eminent domain for the con-
demnation of private property within the district. Ch. 81, § 81, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1st
Extr. Sess. 448 (1960). The district may also acquire, hold, and dispose of property
within or without the district. Ch. 81, § 80, [19611 Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 448
(1960).
120. 5 Cal. 3d at 672-73, 488 P.2d at 396, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The action was
before the court on resident-petitioners' petition for a writ of mandate and for extraor-
dinary relief.
121. See note 119 supra.
122. 5 Cal. 3d at 676-77, 488 P.2d at 399, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 207. See notes 37-
60 supra and accompanying text.
123. 5 Cal. 3d at 677, 488 P.2d at 399, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
124. Id. at 678, 488 P.2d at 400, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
125. Id.
19741
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judicial focus must always be whether or not an individual's constitu-
tionally protected right to vote is impermissibly impaired:
From an individual viewpoint, it hardly matters to the voter whether
it is his next door neighbor, a stranger in another district, or a nonresi-
dent land developer whose vote is assigned substantially more weight
than his own: the disparity dilutes his voting strength and makes of
his attempt to affect the court of his local government through the bal-
lot box a bootless and empty gesture.
120
Having established that the "one person, one vote" cases were appli-
cable to the EMID, the court reached the "inescapable" conclusion that
the weighted voting provision of the act was unconstitutional. 121  In-
deed, the court condemned this land based system as reminiscent of
feudal land structure which permitted the "land-wealthy" to control the
destiny of the "land-poor."
128
Relying on Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski, the Burrey court next
concluded that the restriction of the franchise to landowners was also
constitutionally defective. In the enactment of the EMID, the legisla-
ture proclaimed that its interest in restricting the franchise to landown-
ers was to limit participation in the operations of the district to those
"primarily concerned."'12 9 Since the EMID provided the services charac-
teristic of a city, the court had no difficulty in concluding that the inter-
ests of nonlandowning residents were not substantially less than those
of landowners and that the exclusion thus failed to accomplish its
stated purpose.1 0 Furthermore, the attempt to justify the voting
126. Id.
127. Id. at 679, 488 P.2d at 400, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
128. Id., 488 P.2d at 401, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
129. Ch. 81, § 220(g), [1961] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 457-58 (1960) provides:
The land in the district is not owned by residents. The owners are the ones pri-
marily concerned with the district and the ones who will be supporting the district.
The owners should therefore hold the voting power. Since no general law district
with the necessary powers provides for voting by owners, special legislation is nec-
essary.
This language was deleted from the statute in 1972. Ch. 95, § 7, [1972] Cal. Stat.
130-31.
130. 5 Cal. 3d at 681, 488 P.2d at 402, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 210. Nonlandowners had
a vital interest in the district because it furnished utilities, set charges for its services,
set a tax rate, and had the power to tax both real and personal property. Id. The
court noted:
Nonlandowners resident in the EMID are even more clearly interested and af-
fected then the excluded voters in Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodzieiski by virtue of
the district's power to require them to use its sewage services, its power to provide
(or withhold) police and fire protection and its power to pass regulations having
the force of law. In short, each of the residents of the EMID have virtually the
same interest in the affairs of the district as they would in any municipal govern-
ment.
Id.
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scheme was difficult to reconcile with the fact that a substantial num-
ber of people who had become residents of the district were "more
deeply concerned and affected by many of the district's powers than
the developers.' 3 1
mH. Salyer: THE VALIDATION OF A RESTRICTED VOTING SCHEME
The decision in Burrey, although potentially distinguishable because
of the expansive powers of the EMID, raised serious doubts as to the
validity of similar voting schemes in other special-purpose districts in
California. 3 2 In Salyer, the United States Supreme Court removed
many of these doubts. The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dis-
trict, 3 3 which is located in California's great central valley,'34 was
131. Id. at 682, 488 P.2d at 403, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 211. The court distinguished
Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co., 70 Cal. 2d 627, 451 P.2d 406, 75 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1969),
which involved the voting scheme of the Estero Municipal Improvement District, ch.
82, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 459 (1960). The Estero District was enacted
at the same time as the EMID and was identical in all respects; however, in 1967
the legislature amended the Estero act to provide for a gradual transference of control
to residents by allowing them at each successive election the exclusive selection of an
increasing number of the governing body until all board members were elected by resi-
dents. Ch. 1511, § 5, [1967] Cal. Stat. 3594-95. The court in Cooper determined
that since the transfer of control would be completely accomplished by 1971, there was
no reason to interfere with the method designed to assure resident control which had
been enacted by the legislature. 70 Cal. 2d at 638, 451 P.2d at 413, 75 Cal. Rptr.
at 773. In Burrey, the court did not determine whether Kolodziejski required the leg-
islature to provide a more expeditious transfer of power than provided for in Cooper.
5 Cal. 3d at 683 n.11, 488 P.2d at 404 n.1l, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 212 n. .
132. The Burrey court noted that the decision in Schindler was difficult to reconcile
with the voter equality cases of the United States Supreme Court. However, the court
noted that there was no necessity to face that question since the powers and purpose
of the irrigation district involved in Schindler were substantially less general than those
possessed by the EMID. 5 Cal. 3d at 682 n.8, 488 P.2d at 402-03 n.8, 97 Cal. Rptr.
at 210-11 n.8. Accord, Curtiss v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 957-58 n.19,
501 P.2d 537, 548 n.19, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297, 308 n.19 (1972).
133. California Water Storage Districts are organized pursuant to the Water Storage
District Act, CAL. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 39000 et seq. (West 1966). Such districts
engage in the storage and distribution of water, operate any drainage or reclamation
works connected therewith, may cooperate with other agencies regarding flood control,
incidentally generate and distribute hydroelectric power, and sell and distribute hydro-
electric power when not necessary for its own uses and purposes. There are eight of
these districts in California and they have a combined acreage of 927,843 acres. STATE
CONTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING WATER UTIL-
ITY OPERATIONS OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS OF CAIFORNIA 3 (Fiscal Year 1971-1972)
[hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District consists of approximately 193,000
acres. Four large landowners, Salyer Land Co., West Lake Farms, South Lake Farms,
and J.G. Boswell Co., own almost 85% of the land in the district. Another 189 land-
owners own up to 80 acres each for a total of 2.34% of the agricultural acreage of
250 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
formed as a local response to the basin's water problems. 135 The dis-
trict is a public entity13  governed by a board of directors187 elected
by the qualified voters of the district. Only landowners are qualified
to vote,13  and each landowner is entitled to one vote for each $100
of assessed land value. 3 9  In a suit filed by landowners, a landowner-
the district. J.G. Boswell Co. has the largest number of votes, 37,825, which are
enough to elect a majority of the district's board of directors. Its control is so firmly
established that there has not been an election for directors of the district since 1947.
410 U.S. at 735.
134. The Valley, an elongated structural trough of low elevations, is the "food bas-
ket of California," producing half of the state's farm income. In the twentieth
century, it has become one of the world's important irrigated regions-today three
of its counties rank among the top ten nationally in total agricultural value. As
a farming subregion it has superlative endowment-level terrain, productive soils,
streams and groundwater for irrigation, a long season with a dry harvest period,
good transportation facilities, and access to markets.
This long basin, only slightly smaller than the Sierra Nevada or the Mojave
Desert, approximates 25,000 square miles in area and houses about 15 per cent of
California's people. It stretches for about 450 miles from Redding in the north to
the foot of the Grapevine (the "Ridge Route" or Interstate 5) south of Bakers-
field, thus extending more than half the length of the state.
D. LAN'is, R. SmExN.R & A. KARmN, CAr~woRNu: LAND oF CONTRAST 340 (2d ed.
1970).
135. See 410 U.S. at 722.
136. Before a voter equality problem arises, it must first be shown that there is an
election in a public district. Cf. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967); see
note 244 infra. Professor Weinstein states the problem as follows:
Before the problems posed by particular forms of special purpose units of local
government are considered, it is necessary to point out an elementary distinction
of applicable constitutional law. The state itself or any person engaged in "state
action" must meet certain minimum constitutional standards in contacts with the
public. . . . But while the individual has the right to demand that he be treated
appropriately by an agency engaged in "state action," he does not necessarily have
the right to participate in the control of that agency in the same way he partici-
pates, as a voter, in control of the state. The Supreme Court reapportionment
cases held only that when an agency of the state is controlled by voters, all voters
must be treated as equally as possible. They did not hold that every agency of the
state needs to be in the charge of elected officials.
Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and
Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLtm. L. Rnv. 21, 33 (1965). To illus-
trate this distinction, Professor Weinstein cites the example of Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946). According to Weinstein, the "Court's treatment of the company
town [in Marsh] as a municipality for the purpose of protecting freedom of speech
in no way suggested that those who lived there could elect the town's managers."
Weinstein, supra at 33-34. An interesting question, beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, is whether or not the voter equality cases would be applicable if the owners of
the company town extended the right to select the town's managers to the town's resi-
dents.
137. CAL. WATER CODn ANN. § 40658 (West 1966).
138. Id. § 41000. The landowner does not have to be otherwise qualified to partici-
pate in elections in California. Thus, nonresidents of the district, corporations, and
fiduciaries are allowed to vote if they are landowners within the district. Id. §§
41003-04.
139. CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 41001 (West 1966) provides:
Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned by him
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lessee, and non-landowning residents of the district,' 40 a three-judge
federal district court' 4 ' ruled against ,their claim that the statutory vot-
ing scheme "invidiously discriminated" against them in violation of the
equal protection clause,'42 and they appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court.'
43
A. Exclusion of Residents and Resident-Lessee
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, first examined that portion
of the voting scheme which restricted the franchise to landowners. Ap-
pellants had argued 'that the exclusion of nonlandowning residents was
unconstitutional "since nonlandowning residents have as much interest
in the operations of a district as landowners who may or may not be
residents."' 4  Appellants were obviously relying on the principles
enunciated in Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski to support this asser-
tion.' 43  These cases involved restriction of the franchise to those who
were said to be "primarily interested" in the government entities in-
volved.146  In each case, the Court held that even if the franchise could
be so restricted, the statutory scheme did not accomplish the state's ar-
ticulated goal because those excluded were not substantially less inter-
ested than those to whom the franchise was granted. 47 The appellants
in Salyer hoped to demonstrate that they had an interest in the operations
of the district which was not substantially less than that of the interests
of landowners.
148
However, the Court did not agree that the Kramer line of cases was
is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred dollars ($100), or fraction
thereof, worth of his land, exclusive of improvements, minerals, and mineral rights
therein, in the precinct.
140. Appellants commenced their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief in an effort to prevent the water storage district from
giving effect to certain of the district's voting provisions.
141. Three-judge district courts are ordinarily required when an injunction against
the enforcement of a state statute is sought (28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)), and are con-
vened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970).
142. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144,
146 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory
or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act
of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
144. 410 U.S. at 726. Nonlandowners claimed to have an interest in the purported
flood control activities of the district. The majority viewed these as only incidental
activities of the district. See note 159 infra.
145. 410 U.S. at 726.
146. See notes 61-82 supra and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. 410 U.S. at 726.
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applicable to the water storage district, and, in so deciding, formulated
a new distinction. In Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski, according
to the reasoning of the Salyer Court, "one person, one vote" was applied
because the government unit involved exercised "general governmental
powers" as that term was defined in Avery and extended in Hadley.149
Yet, in each of the former cases the Court exhibited no interest in the
nature of the government unit involved. In fact, the Kramer Court
explicitly manifested its lack of interest:
Nor is the need for close judicial examination affected because the
district meetings and the school board do not have "general" legislative
powers. Our exacting examination is not necessitated by the subject
of the election; rather, it is required because some resident citizens are
permitted to participate and some are not.150
Moreover, Kramer, which dealt with disenfranchisement in a school dis-
trict election, was decided before the Court had extended the principle
of Avery to school districts in Hadley."5 The Salyer Court tried to
obfuscate this fact by stating that both Kramer and Hadley "extended
the 'one person, one vote' principle to school districts . . ,. . By
equating the distinct issues of disenfranchisement and dilution, the
Court avoided the automatic application of the strict standard of review
and held that Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski are applicable only
to units of government exercising "general governmental powers."
Therefore, the crucial issue from the Court's perspective was to
determine whether or not the district exercised "general governmental
powers." The Court concluded that because the water storage district
had a "limited special purpose"'5 3 and because its activities had a "dis-
proportionate effect' 54 on landowners, it fit the exception mentioned
in Avery.155 With respect to the district's limited purpose, the Court,
although conceding that the district was vested with some "typical gov-
ernmental powers,"' 56 was of the opinion that it had "relatively limited
149. Id. at 727.
150. 395 U.S. at 629; see note 68 supra.
151. See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
152. 410 U.S. at 727.
153. Id. at 728.
154. Id.
155. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
156. 410 U.S. at 728 (footnote omitted). The district has a wide range of govern-
mental powers to accomplish its assigned functions. It has the power to contract for
the construction of district projects (CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 43152 (West 1966) );
employ and discharge persons on a regular staff (id. § 43152); acquire by condemna-
tion all property necessary for its purposes (id. § 43500); issue general obligation
bonds and issue interest-bearing warrants (id. §§ 44900-45900); levy assessments and
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authority,'15 7 for the primary purpose of the district was to provide
for the acquisition, storage, and distribution -of water for agricultural
use. 5 ' Furthermore, the Court noted that the district did not engage
in the performance of any other services usually undertaken by a mu-
nicipal body.15 9
The Court reached the conclusion that the activities of the district
"disproportionately affect[ed] landowners"'01 0 in light of the unique
method in which the district was financed and operated.'' Since the
costs of the district were assessed against the land in proportion to the
benefits received' 62 and since the charges for district services were col-
lectable in the same proportion, 63 the Court believed that:
[T]here is no way that the economic burdens of district operations can
fall on residents qua residents, and the operations of the districts pri-
marily affect the land within their boundaries.' 64
Based on its "limited purpose" and the "disproportionate effect" of dis-
trict operations on landowners, the Court found it understandable that
the "statutory framework for election of directors . . . focuse[d] on the
land benefited, rather than on people as such."' 65
Since the district fit the exception mentioned in Avery, 16 6 the Court
concluded that the principles of the voter equality cases were inappli-
charges (id. § 46000 (West Supp. 1974)); and cooperate, including by contract, with any
other public agency, state or federal (id. § 43151 (West 1966)).
157. 410 U.S. at 728.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 728-29. The Court summarily rejected appellants' argument that the dis-
trict was engaged in flood control activities. The Court determined that the only flood
control activities the district could engage in were when cooperating with other public
agencies and thus concluded that any flood control activities were incidental to the pri-
mary function of the district-water storage and distribution. Id. at 728 n.8.
160. Id. at 729.
161. See notes 204-05 infra and accompanying text.
162. CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 46000 (West Supp. 1974); id. § 47180.
163. Id. §§ 43003, 43006 (West Supp. 1974).
164. 410 U.S. at 729 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 729-30. The Court noted that California had not extended the franchise
to all residents or to all residents with some exceptions, but instead, had extended the
franchise to all landowners, whether resident or non-resident, and whether a natural
person or not. Id. at 730. Because the appellants had not challenged the right of
nonresident and corporate landowners to vote (see note 138 supra), the Court further
believed that to allow residents to vote "would engraft onto the statutory scheme a
wholly new class of voters in addition to those enfranchised by the statute." 410 U.S.
at 730. The reason for engaging in this analysis is somewhat unclear, for it would
appear that these remarks are unrelated to the question of whether or not the district
exercised "general governmental powers." See text accompanying notes 153-55 supra.
166. 410 U.S. at 728.
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cable to its elections.'6 7 This determination dictated the subsequent
resolution of the case; since the voter equality principles did not apply,
neither did the strict standard of review. 6 ' Dealing first with the ex-
clusion of residents, the Court stated that the appropriate test with
which to assess their equal protection claim was:
[W]hether the State's decision to deny the franchise to residents of
the district while granting it to landowners was "wholly irrelevant to
achievement of the regulation's objectives.' 69
Under this "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact,"'70
the inescapable conclusion was that the exclusion of residents was con-
stitutional.
171
A "rational" basis for the statutory exclusion was premised on the
assumption that the interests of district residents were minimal172 and
the belief that exclusion was required to attract landowner support for
the formation and operation of the district. Although the Court ac-
knowledged that the activities of the district affected all residents to
some extent, this interest was held to be only incidental when compared
with the interests of district landowners. 7 3  Furthermore, since the dis-
trict was to be financed solely by landowners, the Court determined
167. Id. at 730.
168. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
169. 410 U.S. at 730, quoting Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552, 556 (1947).
170. Gunther, supra note 7, at 8.
171. 410 U.S. at 730-31.
172. Id. It should be noted that this is not the same test that the Court undertook
earlier (see text accompanying notes 153-65 supra) when it was analyzing the charac-
ter of the government unit. There, the Court was interested in the interests of resi-
dents only in determining the nature of the government unit. Here, the Court is look-
ing for a rational basis to support the statutory exclusion.
173. Although acknowledging that the district affects all residents of the district, Jus-
tice Rehnquist was not impressed by this fact:
Since assessments imposed by the district become a cost of doing business for
those who farm within it, and that cost must ultimately be passed along to the
consumers of the produce, food shoppers in far away metropolitan areas are to
some extent likewise "affected" by the activities of the district. Constitutional ad-
judication cannot rest on any such "house that Jack built" foundation, however.
410 U.S. at 730-31. Compare Thomas Jefferson's criticism of a bill to grant a federal
charter to a mining company:
Congress are authorized to defend the nation. Ships are necessary for defence;
copper is necessary for ships; mines, necessary for copper; a company necessary to
work the mines; and who can doubt this reasoning who has ever played at "This
is the House that Jack Built"? Under such a process of filiation of necessities, the
sweeping clause makes clean work.
G. GUNMER & N. DowLiNG, CONSTIUoNAL LAw 223-24 (8th ed. 1970), quoting
1 WARREN, THE SUPREmE CoURT IN UmTED STATES HISTORY 501 (rev. ed. 1926); and
the Court's reasoning in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1970),
especially that discussed in note 82 supra,
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that the California Legislature reasonably could have concluded that
such support would not have been forthcoming unless landowners as
a group had the dominant voice in district operations. 7 4 In addition,
the Court observed that it could not be said to be "unfair or inequit-
able" to restrict the franchise to landowners since they as a group in-
curred all the costs.' 5 Based upon these considerations, the Court con-
cluded:
Landowners as a class were to bear the entire burden of the district's
costs, and the State could rationally conclude that they, to the exclusion
of residents, should be charged with responsibility for its operation.' 7 6
Having decided that residents could constitutionally be excluded from
district participation, the Court next determined that lessees could like-
wise be excluded. While the Court accepted appellants' contention that
lessees had an interest in the activities of the district analogous to land-
owners, it stated:
[Ihe question for our determination is not whether or not we would
have lumped them together had we been enacting the statute in ques-
tion, but instead whether "if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify" California's decision to deny the franchise to lessees
while granting it to landowners. 17
7
In its search for "rational" justifications for the exclusion of lessees,
the Court found a number of reasons, including the avoidance of possi-
ble ballot manipulation, landowner objection, and problems of voting
administration, that adequately justified California's exclusion.' 7
8
Justice Douglas dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
concluded that the statutory exclusion of residents and lessees was un-
constitutional 79 in light of the strict standards of the disenfranchise-
ment cases.' Relying on Kramer, Justice Douglas argued that even
if the franchise could be limited to those "primarily interested," that
174. CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 39400 (West 1966) sets forth the initial require-
ments for the establishment of a water storage district:
A majority in number of the holders of title to land irrigated or susceptible of ir-
rigation from a common source and by the same system of works, who are also the
holders of title to a majority in value of the land may propose the formation of
a district under the provisions of this division or the formation of the district may
be proposed by not less than 500 petitioners, each of whom is the holder of title
to land therein and which petitioners include the holders of title to not less than
10 percent in value of the land included within the proposed district.
175. 410 U.S. at 731.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 732, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 736.
180. Id.
1974]
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limitation would be upheld only if those excluded were substantially
less interested than those included in the grant of the franchise. 8' In
Justice Douglas' words, the majority's assertion that landowners were
primarily interested was a "great distortion"'8 12 since the activities of
the district, "irrigation, water storage, the building of levees, and flood
control, implicate the entire community."'' 8  As in Kramer, Cipriano,
and Kolodziejski, Justice Douglas would have held the exclusion uncon-
situtional because of the substantial interests of lessees and residents.' 84
He thus concluded that residents, lessees, and landowners should all
participate in the affairs of the water storage district. 185
As indicated previously, there is no support for the Court's assertion
that Kramer, Cipriano, and Koldziejski are applicable only when the
government entity exercises "general governmental powers."'18 6 The
language in Kramer is broad and general, and would appear to apply
to all elections for public officials:
87
This careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the
franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any
unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in politi-
cal affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legit-
imacy of representative government. 18
An individual's right to cast a ballot should be afforded the same
degree of protection whether the election is for a state legislator, mem-
bers of a school board, or the directors of a water storage district. As
the Court stated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 89 "[T]he political franchise
of voting. . . is regarded as a fundamental political right, because pre-
servative of all rights."'1 0  With the multiplicity of government units
in this country, 19' "[s]tatutes granting the franchise to residents on a
selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any ef-
181. Id., quoting Kr-amer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
182. Id. at 737.
183. Id. at 738.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See text accompanying notes 149-52 supra.
187. Gaines, supra note 110, at 218-19.
188. 395 U.S. at 626.
189. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
190. Id. at 370. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Evans v. Corn-
man, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,
626 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
191. California contains roughly 6,000 tax-leving units of government. The aver-
age citizen is within the jurisdiction of at least four of these subdivisions in addition
to the state and federal jurisdictions.
P. RuTH & B. SToNE? CALFQ~..'9 POL..'CAn PRCEsS 17 (1973).
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fective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their
lives."'1 2  This is exactly what happened in Salyer as a result of the
Court's less-than-exacting standard of review.19 3
Under the Kramer test, the exclusion of residents and lessees would
be strictly scrutinized to determine, first, if their exclusion was nec-
essary to promote the state's articulated goal and, second, if there was
a "compelling state interest" to support the exclusion.'9 A strong ar-
gument can be made that the exclusion of residents would survive the
Kramer test. The Court, in analyzing the interest of landowners to
determine the nature of the government unit, correctly determined that
the district has a "disproportionate effect" on district landowners.' 95
Compared with the interests of landowners, nonlandowning residents
of the district are in fact "substantially less interested or affected' ' 96
in the operations of the district. The district's residents receive none
of the services that the entity is authorized to perform and do not finance
its operations, nor is the district authorized to deal with problems that
affect their lives.' 97 Therefore, the statutory scheme is sufficiently
tailored to accomplish the state's articulated goal of restricting the
franchise to those "primarily interested."
There is also a compelling state justification that can be offered in
support of the statutory exclusion. Although there is some question
as to the validity of the assertion,198 the Court stated that the district
192. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (footnote
omitted).
193. See text accompanying notes 201-02 infra.
194. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
195. See text accompanying notes 160-64 supra.
196. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
197. Unlike other districts engaged in the supply of agricultural water, water storage
districts are not significantly involved in the supply of water for domestic use. Con-
tra, J. BAIN, R. CAVES & J. MARGOLIS, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA'S WATER INDUsTRY: THE
COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN DEVELOPING A SCARCE NATURAL
RESOYRCE 78 (1966). Of California's eight water storage districts, only one-the Ar-
vin-Edison Water Storage District-is engaged in the sale of water for residential use.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 256-57.
As the majority found, the flood control activities of the district appear to be only
incidental to its primary function. 410 U.S. at 728 n.8. But see 410 U.S. at 737
(Douglas, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 98
(1973). The district may not engage in flood control activities that benefit residents,
and thus the interest of residents is substantially less than the interests of landowners
in the district. Kings County, the county in which the Tulare Lake Basin Water Stor-
age District is located, is authorized to deal with flood control problems. See, e.g.,
CAL. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 8100, 8110 (West 1971).
198. In The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973), it is asserted
that the fact that irrigation districts (CAL. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 20500 et seq. (West
1974] 257
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could not have been formed or operated without the landowner support
which the voting scheme was designed to solicit.10 This alone would
be a sufficient justification for the exclusion since the district would
not exist without it.200
On the other hand, it is obvious that the exclusion of lessees could
not survive the Kramer test, for as the Court conceded, the "[1lessees
undoubtedly do have an interest in the activities of . . . [the] district
analogous to that of landowners .. *.."01 Thus, their exclusion does
not accomplish the state's articulated goal of limiting the franchise to
those "primarily interested."
As the exclusion of lessees attests, the Court's approach to the issue
of disenfranchisement poses a serious threat that individuals who are
1956)), function without such a system of voting is demonstrative proof that there
is no special need for such a system in water storage districts. 87 HARv. L. REV. at
103. This argument, however, ignores the realities of irrigation district operations. Ir-
rigation districts, like water storage districts, require significant landowner support in
the formation process. CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 20700 (West 1956). To attract
this support, landowners are assured control of the districts. Although the franchise
is not restricted to landowners, only landowners are qualified to be directors of the
district. Id. § 21100 (West Supp. 1974). Additionally, a number of irrigation districts
now restrict the franchise to landowners. Id. §§ 20527.5-20527.7, 20527.9 (West Supp.
1974).
Irrigation districts, unlike water storage districts, perform a significant number of serv-
ices that affect non-landowning residents. Id. §§ 22075-233 (West 1956). See AN-
NuAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 8 (over 25% of water sales are for residential use).
Thus, the legislature has determined that all residents should be allowed to participate
in district elections.
Although water storage districts may be able to operate without the restricted voting
scheme, even the experience of irrigation districts reflects the need to attract landowner
support. California does have a compelling state interest in the development of its
water resources. See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. 14, § 3; CAL. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 100,
104-05 (West 1971); Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 1 Cal. App. 3d 831,
839, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61, 66 (1969); People ex rel. Chapman v. Sacramento Drainage
Dist., 155 Cal. 373, 379-81, 103 P. 207, 211 (1909); cf. 410 U.S. at 721-23. The
restricted voting schemes in water storage districts are arguably designed to further this
important goal by expeditiously encouraging landowner support.
199. 410 U.S. at 731.
200. Arguably, when the state's articulated goal is to limit the franchise to those
"primarily interested" (or, in other words, to exclude those with no concern) in the
government unit, that justification alone serves a compelling state interest. If the state
has sufficiently established that a person has "no concern with the outcome of an elec-
tion, it is not a denial of equal protection to deny him the right to vote." 67 MICH.
L. REv. 1260, 1261 n.5 (1969). In other words, the excluded party has as much right
to vote in the district's election as a resident of Los Angeles has to vote in San Fran-
cisco's election (although San Francisco's government may somewhat affect him). In
both instances, it is not unfair to exclude the individual from participation. See 67
MicH. L. REv. 1260, 1261 n.5 (1969).
201. 410 U.S. at 732.
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substantially affected by a government entity can be excluded from par-
ticipation in its elections. For once it is initially decided that the entity
meets the Avery test, its voting scheme will be examined under the
traditional standard. Indeed, the Court's analysis would seem to require
the application of the traditional test even if the excluded group is the
group that is disproportionately affected by the government unit. Sup-
pose that in Salyer the statutory scheme excluded landowners who
owned less than 100 acres.202 Under the Court's analysis, the fact that
the voting scheme is different should not change the result as to the
character of the government entity (or the test to be employed). In
determining the applicability of the voter equality principles, the Court
looked not to the interests of the excluded party, but to the nature of
the government unit. Thus, if the Court's reasoning were followed, the
nature of the voting scheme should not change the result of the threshold
determination of which test to apply. The exclusion of landowners with
less than 100 acres, like the exclusion of lessees, would be analyzed by
the traditional test. Such an anomalous result surely raises questions
as to the wisdom of the majority's approach to the exclusion issue.
B. Dilution-The Weighted Voting Scheme
The Court devoted little attention to the portion of the statutory
scheme that gave each landowner one vote for each $100 of assessed
land value.203 Since the Court had previously determined that the voter
equality decisions were inapplicable to the water storage district, the
traditional standard of review was employed. The Court summarily
rejected appellants' assertion that equality of voting was being evaded
as inconsistent with "the realities of water storage district operation.
20 4
202. See, e.g., NEv. Rsv. STAT. § 539.123 (1967) (must be the holder of title to
five or more acres to vote in irrigation district); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-05-
03 (1960) (must own at least five acres to vote in irrigation district); S.D. CoMn, an
LAws ANN. tit. 46, § 12-2 (1967) (must own at least ten acres to vote in irrigation
district).
203. The J.G. Boswell Co. has 37,825 votes, which are enough to give it control of
the district's governing body. 410 U.S. at 735; see note 142 supra. Small landowners are
given some protection against tyrannical treatment at the hands of large landowners.
In order to approve a district project, both a majority of votes cast and a majority
of voters are required for approval. CAt. WATER CODE ANN. § 42355 (West Supp.
1974). This gives small landowners a negative influence with which to protect them-
selves from crippling assessments.
204. 410 U.S. at 734. Appellants also relied on Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966), for the proposition that wealth has "no relation to resident-voter
qualifications." 410 U.S. at 733. The Court rejected this argument on the same
grounds that it rejected the dilution argument. Id. at 733-34. In Harper, the Court
stated:
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The Court considered it controlling that the costs of the district's opera-
tions were assessed against landowners in proportion to the benefits re-
ceived:
Thus, as the District Court found, "the benefits and burdens to each
landowner . . are in proportion to the assessed value of the land."
We cannot say that the California legislative decision to permit voting
in the same proportion is not rationally based.20 5
The weighted voting scheme thus survived the less-than-exacting ex-
amination of the traditional test.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, contended that the scheme was unconsti-
tutional because the district "surely performs 'important governmental
functions' which 'have sufficient impact throughout the district' to jus-
tify the application of the Avery principle. 206 Justice Douglas thus
attempted to circumvent the question left open in Avery:
[Whether or not] a special-purpose unit of government assigned the per-
formance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents . ..
[could be] apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the
citizens most affected by the organization's functions. 207
Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate in-
telligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or prop-
erty, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.
383 U.S. at 668 (citation omitted). Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969), stated that in Harper, "[tihe criterion of 'wealth' apparently was
added to the list of 'suspects' as an alternative justification . . . ." Id. at 658. How-
ever, the Burger Court has generally been reluctant to treat discrimination based on
wealth as a suspect classification. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Gaines,
supra note 110, at 234-37.
205. 410 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added and citation omitted). The district court did
conclude that the unequal land size of the divisions within the district violated the
equal protection clause:
The present divisions have not been redivisioned for 40 years. Total assessed
valuation of the land in Division 4 is nearly three times greater than the total as-
sessed valuation in Division 10 (Division 4-$1,954,547; Division 10-$688,425).
The result is that $100 of assessed valuation in Division 10 has almost three times
the voting power of $100 of assessed valuation in Division 4. In addition, Division
4 has 110 separate landowners, whereas Division 10 has only 4. Each division is
entitled to one director on the District's Board of Directors. Consequently, the 110
landowners in Division 4 have only one-third the representation on the Board when
compared with Division 10.
Such malapportionment presents a classic violation of equal protection ....
342 F. Supp. 144, 146-47 (1972). The water storage district did not appeal this con-
clusion to the Supreme Court. The determination of the district court is consistent
with the traditional standard of review. Unless there were some rational state policy
to justify the disproportionate land size of the district's divisions, there would be a vio-
lation of equal protection.
206. 410 U.S. at 740.
207. 390 U.S. at 483-84.
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Clearly to accept the majority's assumption that the water storage
district in Salyer is the type of district described in the Avery exception
is only to recognize the issue presented, not to decide it. In the first
place, to say, as did the Salyer majority, that the exception in Avery
applies does not answer the question as to what equal protection stand-
ard is applicable; and secondly, even if the traditional standard were
to apply, can there be any rational justification for a system of voting
that places control of a government agency in the hands of one large
landowner?
208
In Avery, the Court suggested that there might be some government
entities where the popular election requirements of Reynolds--"one
person, one vote"-would not be required.20 9  But it nowhere sug-
gested that the strict standard of review would be inapplicable. The
basic rationale for the Avery exception can be explicated by language
from Reynolds:
[T]he concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as re-
quiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation
to the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect to the
allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State,
stand in the same relation regardless of where they live.210
As the language in Avery suggests, the Court envisioned some limited
government entities where the fact that an individual resided in the geo-
graphic area of the district would not, by itself, mean that he stood
in the same relation to the government action as other individuals.
Thus, strict voter equality would possibly have been inapplicable, and
the apportionment of the government unit could validly consider an
area or group's primary interest.
208. See note 133 supra. Justice Douglas furnished information tending to show
that the J.G. Boswell Co. was controlling this public entity in furtherance of its own
pecuniary goals:
From its inception in 1926, this district has had repeated flood control problems.
Four rivers, Kings, Kern, Tule, and Kaweah, enter Tulare Lake Basin. South of
Tulare Lake Basin is Buena Vista Lake. In the past Buena Vista has been used
to protect Tulare Lake Basin by storing Kern River water in the former. That is
how Tulare Lake Basin was protected from menacing floods in 1952. But that
was not done in the great 1969 flood, the result being that 88,000 of the 193,000
acres in respondent district were flooded. The board of the respondent district-
dominated by big landowner J.G. Boswell Co.-voted 6-4 to table the motion that
would put into operation the machinery to divert the flood waters into the Buena
Vista Lake. The reason is that J.G. Boswell Co. had a long-term agricultural lease
in the Buena Vista Lake Basin and flooding it would have interfered with the
planting, growing, and harvesting of crops the next season.
410 U.S. at 737.
209. 390 U.S. at 483-84. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
210. 377 U.S. at 565.
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But this problem is not present in water storage districts; the people
who have no interest in the unit have been excluded from participation.
Since all landowners are similarly situated, they should have an equal
voice in the operations of the government unit.21' Therefore, even
though the district apparently falls within the Avery exception, "one
person, one vote" should apply to landowners and lessees because the
rationale for the Avery exception has no application to those who main-
tain an interest in land within the district.
21 2
Even assuming that the traditional standard were properly employed,
the Court failed to assess the realities of the weighted voting scheme
by laconically concluding that it was rationally based. As Justice
Douglas indicated, the results of such a system of voting were to enable
one large landowner to elect a majority of the directors of the water
storage district.1 3 While property qualifications as a precondition to
voting have a lengthy historical basis in this country, 21 4 the concept
of a one person electorate is at odds with American tradition. Based
on the American experience, there can be no rational basis to support
a system of voting that places permanent control of a government entity
in the hands of one large landowner decade after decade.215
C. The Inclusion of Corporate Voters
Although the appellants did not challenge the inclusion of corporate
voting,2 16 Justice Douglas sententiously dissented from their participa-.
tion:
211. See text accompanying note 210 supra. Although large landowners may receive
more services and thus pay more for district operations, the impact of district decisions
affects small landowners to an equal extent. In fact, smaller landowners with less ec-
onomic resources may be more greatly affected than the larger landowners.
212. See text accompanying notes 209-10 supra.
213. See note 133 supra.
214. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685-86 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See J. PHILLIPS, MuNrcnAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMIISTRATIoN IN AMER-
icA 175 (1960).
215. See notes 133, 208 supra. Justice Douglas furnished information that tended
to support the conclusion that the district was being operated to further the pecuniary
interests of its ruling landowner. See note 208 supra. John Stuart Mill succinctly crit-
icized such a state of affairs existent when
[olne man of superhuman mental activity manages the entire affairs of a mentally
passive people. Their passivity is implied in the very idea of absolute power. The
nation as a whole, and every individual composing it, are without any potential
voice in their own destiny. They exercise no will in respect to their collective in-
terests. All is decided for them by a will not their own, which it is legally a crime
for them to disobey. What sort of human beings can be formed under such a regi-
men?
J. S. MILL, CONSmERATIONS ON REPREsENTATVE GOVERNMENT 37 (Library of Liberal
Arts ed. 1958).
2i6. 410 U.S. at 730,
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It is indeed grotesque to think of corporations voting within the
framework of political representation of people . .. [[It is unthink-
able in terms of the American tradition that corporations should be
admitted to the franchise. Could a State allot voting rights to its cor-
porations, weighting each vote according to the wealth of the corpora-
tion? Or could it follow the rule of one corporation, one vote?
217
Continuing, Justice Douglas stated:
Four corporations can exercise these governmental powers as they
choose, leaving every individual inhabitant with a weak, ineffective
voice. The result is a corporate political kingdom undreamed of by
those who wrote our Constitution.
218
From a standpoint of policy, Justice Douglas' remarks are undoubt-
edly sound. But the real question is whether or not there is any consti-
tutional provision that prevents corporate participation in water storage
district operations.
It seems clear that a state can constitutionally deny corporations the
right to vote in most elections,2 1 9 but can a state constitutionally grant
217. Id. at 741.
218. Id. at 742; see note 208 supra.
219. While corporations are considered "persons" within the meaning of the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment (Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 536 (1933); Pembina
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187-89 (1888); see
Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. Rnv.
202, 236 (1946)), this is not to say that they are being denied equal protection when the
state denies them the right to vote.
A corporation is usually regarded as a "person" within the meaning of particular
constitutional provisions unless the provision is one which is peculiarly limited to natu-
ral persons. H. HENN, LAW OF ConPoRATONS 111 (2d ed. 1970). Thus, in addition
to enjoying the protection of the equal protection and due process clauses, a corporation
is entitled to the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures (Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946) ); ansi the
fifth amendment's protection against deprivation of liberty or property without due
process of law. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889). A cor-
poration, however, is not entitled to the privileges or protections of other provisions
of the Constitution because they only extend to natural persons. Thus, a corporation
is not afforded the privilege against self-incrimination provided by the fifth amendment
(Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964)); and
is not a citizen within the privileges and immunities clauses of article four, section
two, and the fourteenth amendment. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
244 (1936); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869).
The fact that a corporation does not fall within constitutional provisions dealing with
citizenship or natural persons is of great significance. As the Court stated in Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869):
The term citizens as there used [privileges and immunities clause of article four]
applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to
19741
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the franchise to a corporation?220 Until Justice Douglas' dissent in Sal-
yer, this question does not seem to have arisen. There is, of course,
no textually demonstrable provision of the Constitution which would
prohibit such a grant. Justice Douglas' "analysis" in terms of the "gro-
tesqueness" of the proposition is hardly satisfying. It harkens back
to the "natural law" of "fundamental fairness" and "shocked consci-
ences" which typified Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's analysis of
some areas of fourteenth amendment due process 221-an analytical
the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only
the attributes which the legislature has prescribed.
Id. at 177. See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 113-14 (rev. vol. 1963). A corporation not being a citizen, cannot claim the privi-
leges afforded to those who are.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 544 (1964), the Court stated that the Consti-
tution protected the right of "all qualified citizens to vote." Therefore, non-citizen cor-
porations which are merely creatures of the state (1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAw OF PRIVATE CORPOaRTONS § 113 (rev. vol. 1963)), cannot claim that there is a
discriminatory classification by being denied the right to vote. Cf. Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634, 648, 648 n.13 (1973). And even if there were a classification
requiring justification by the state, their exclusion would surely meet both the tests of
the traditional and strict standards of review. (Certainly, the strict test would not be
employed since the right of corporations to vote is not a "fundamental" right).
220. Many state legislatures apparently believe that they can. In California, corpo-
rations have been permitted to vote in water storage districts since 1923 (ch.
419, § 12, [1923] Cal. Stat. 962), and in California Water Districts (see note 241
infra) since 1913. Ch. 387, 9 24, [1913] Cal. Stat. 832. Other states have
also granted the franchise to corporations. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 298.11 (Supp.
1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 245.060 (1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 31-407 (1968); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 539.123 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-05-06 (1960); S.D. Com-
PILED LAWS ANN. tit. 46, § 12-2 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 73, § 7-4 (1953);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 87.60.150 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-21-3, 19-21-
7 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-299 (1959); State ex rel. Harris v. Hansen, 117
N.W. 412, 415-16 (Neb. 1908).
Those districts in which corporations are allowed to vote are in rural areas where
the functions of the government body are land directed. While property ownership
as the basic requirement of voter eligibility long ago disappeared (BOLLENS, supra note
2, at 250), these districts retained it because of the close relationship between the ac-
tivities of the district and property ownership. Since the focus of voter eligibility was
on land ownership, many states allowed all land owners to participate whether or not
natural persons.
221. See, e.g., Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952):
[Wie are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which . . . [the con-
viction in this case] was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is
conduct that shocks the conscience.
Id. at 172. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio,
,67 U.S. 643, 683 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Poe v, UlUman, 367 V.$. 497, 541
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technique which Justice Douglas has himself roundly condemned.222 A
complete exploration of the problem of corporate voting is beyond the
scope of this Comment, but it is suggested that if the problem does
arise, no satisfactory solution will be found if the Court allows itself
to be swayed by visions of "corporate political kingdoms undreamed
of" by those who have been given the solemn duty of being the supreme
arbiters of the meaning of the Constitution.
Instead, it is suggested that the appropriate framework for analysis
will be found in the equal protection clause. A direct application of
the "one person, one vote" principles could be employed to strike down
the grant of the franchise to corporations. Since a corporation can
only act through individuals-persons who presumably have a vote in
their own right-it could be argued that these individuals have been
accorded a greater voice in the political selection process. 23  In other
words, a case of dilution would be established and, therefore, the statu-
tory grant of voting rights would be subject to a constitutional infirmity.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to envision situations where no
conceivable case of dilution could be established, situations where no
person associated with the corporation had a vote of his own in a par-
ticular election. This is especially obvious in water storage districts
when no corporate director, officer or shareholder owns land in the
district. Thus, while the equal protection clause would appear to be
an appropriate point of departure, some corporate voting arrangements
will be difficult to attack on traditional constitutional grounds. Indeed,
in the water district situation, once the decision has been made that
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfur-
ter, J., for the Court); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
222. See, e.g., Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952):
[W]e cannot in fairness free the state courts from . . . [the command of the fifth
amendment] and yet excoriate them for flouting the "decencies of civilized con-
duct" when they admit the evidence. That is to make the rule turn not on the
Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here.
Id. at 179. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., con-
curring, joined by Douglas, J.); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40 (1949) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting,
joined by Douglas, J.). But see Justice Douglas' dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961):
Yet to say that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee of
the Constitution may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to override spe-
cific guarantees so long as what it does fails to shock the sensibilities of a major-
ity of the Court.
Id. at 518 (footnote omitted).
223. See note 219 supra.
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the controlling consideration in the distribution of the franchise should
be land ownership and not population, it is difficult to see why people
who exercise the power of ownership through the vehicle of a corpora-
tion should be denied the franchise.2 4  Permitting the state to grant
the franchise to such persons by bestowing it directly upon the corpora-
tion avoids the troublesome questions that would inevitably be associ-
ated with any state attempt to determine which natural persons involved
with the corporation should be given what fraction of the vote or votes
involved. By granting the vote directly to the corporation the state
permits the internal political forces of the business to decide for them-
selves how their power might be exercised. If the decision to distribute
the franchise according to the amount of land owned is constitutionally
permissible, the decision to grant the ballot to the owners directly (cor-
porate or otherwise) seems no less permissible.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Salyer ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
The Court in Salyer has affirmatively established that there are limits
to the voter equality principles by holding them inapplicable to water
storage districts. The key to the applicability of the voter equality cases
now appears to be the nature of the government entity involved. In
Salyer, the water storage district fit the Avery exception "by reason
of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its
activities on landowners as a group . *... ,,22 The impact of Salyer
will thus depend on how many government entities can meet this excep-
tion. By determining whether or not a government unit performs a
"special limited purpose" and whether or not its activities "dispropor-
tionately affect" a definable group, a workable test can be developed
to determine the applicability of the voter equality cases.
A. Special Limited Purpose
Language from Salyer wi assist in the illumination of the concept
of "special limited purpose":
[The water storage district] has relatively limited authority ...
It provides no other general public services such as schools, housing,
transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily
financed by a municipal body. There are no towns, shops, hospitals,
or other facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the dist-
trict boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses,
224. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAav. L. REv. 1, 96 n.8 (1973).
225. 410 U.S. at 728.
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or trains.226
Although the question is not free from difficulty, the Court appears
to be defining most special-purpose districts in this country.2  The
court emphasizes the fact that the district provides "no other general
public services, ' 228 which tends to support the proposition that when
only one general public service is provided the requirement of "special
limited purpose" is satisfied. Since one of the dominant characteristics
of a special district is that it is statutorily limited to providing a single
service,2 29 most special districts would meet the Court's definition of
"special limited purpose. '230
B. Disproportionate Effect on a Definable Group
Although every government unit has varying impacts on the citizens
within its jurisdiction, it is difficult to define with reasonable precision
any group of citizens that can be said to be disproportionately af-
fected.231 This is generally so because the services of many govern-
ment entities "implicate the entire community. '2 2  Special-purpose dis-
tricts can be grouped into eleven categories based on the functions they
perform:
They are health and sanitation; protection to persons and property;
road transportation facilities and aids; nonroad transportation facilities
and aids; utilities; housing; natural resource and agricultural assistance;
education; parks and recreation; cemeteries; and miscellaneous.2 33
As the categories indicate, most of the services performed are ones in
which the public as a whole would have an interest.
Should it be asserted that the activities of a given special-purpose
district "disproportionately affect" a definable group, three factors
should be considered in analyzing the interests of persons that are said
226. Id. at 728-29 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
227. See note 2 supra.
228. 410 U.S. at 728-29 (emphasis added).
229. BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 21; ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2,
at 3.
230. Some special districts, like the Embarcadero Municipal Improvement District
(see notes 113-31 supra and accompanying text), provide a wide range of services. In
fact, the powers granted to some special districts are more extensive than those exer-
cised by cities and towns in some states. ADVIsoRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
2, at 3.
231. See generally ADVISORY COMMISSioN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PF-
FORMANCE OF URBAN FuNcTiONs: LOCAL AND AREAWiDE (1963).
232. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 738
(1973) (Douglas, I., dissenting).
233. BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 21.
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to be outside that group:
(1) Does the district have the power to tax the persons or property
of other than the group that is said to be disproportionately affected?
234
(2) Does the district have police or regulatory power over persons
other than the group that is said to be disproportionately affected?
235
(3) Does the district have power to engage in activities that directly
affect the quality of life of a group other than the one that is said
to be disproportionately affected?
236
If the answer to any of these three questions is in the affirmative, it
is contended that the district does not "disproportionately affect" a de-
234. The power of taxation is defined as follows:
Although various definitions have been given from time to time by the courts, the
definition which is most commonly approved is that taxes are the enforced propor-
tional contributions from persons and property, levied by the state by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs.
16 E. McQuiLLEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPA. CORPORaTIONS § 44.02 (rev. vol. 1972)
(footnotes omitted).
235. See C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAw 528-29 (1957).
236. Determining when an activity directly affects the quality of life of an individual
will not be difficult in most circumstances. A person can be directly affected by a
government activity in two major ways: (1) he or she can be the direct recipient
of the government service in some tangible manner, e.g., refuse collection; or (2) he
or she can be among the class of persons intended to be benefited by the service. If
a person is not directly receiving the government service, it must be determined if the
individual is an intended beneficiary of the government activity. This inquiry presents
little difficulty because most government services can be said to affect the public or
general welfare:
Generally ...it appears that under circumstances of particular cases, public
welfare includes public convenience, general prosperity, the greatest welfare of the
public, all the great public needs, . . . whatever is required for the public good, the
suppression of all things hurtful to the comfort and welfare of society, and finally
all regulations which promote the general interest and prosperity of the public.
8 E. McQUILLEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.20 (rev. Vol. 1965)
(footnote omitted). Thus, even though the government body directly provides a serv-
ice to a class of persons, all citizens are directly affected by the entity because the
services are designed to benefit the community as a whole. See ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PERFORMANCE OF URBAN FUNCTIONS 42-44
(1963). This is true of units engaged in the function of education (id. at 76); librar-
ies (id. at 88); parks and recreation (id. at 103-05); fire protection (id. at 114); police
protection (id. at 128); public welfare (id. at 141-42); public health (id. at 154); hospi-
tals (id. at 168); air pollution control (id. at 181); refuse collection and disposal (id.
at 190); water supply and sewage disposal (id. at 209); housing (id. at 237); and
transportation (id. at 262).
From the above analysis, it is contended that with regard to most government units
there cannot be defined a class of persons who either are not the direct recipient of
the government service or are not within the class to be benefited by the service. This
" ijs not surprising, for in most of American society the activities of a part affect the
whole. See 6 E. McQuiLLEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.34 (rev.
1vol. 1969). This is not always the case in rural America. See notes 237-42 infra
and accompanying text.
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finable group. For the power to tax,2 7 the power to regulate, or the
power to affect the quality of one's life style indicates that an individual
has a very substantial interest in the operation of the government unit
involved.
Under the above analysis, most special-purpose districts would not
meet the Avery exception because their activities do not "dispropor-
tionately affect" any given group. Two factors support this conclusion.
First, a district's taxing base will often not correspond exactly to its
service base.238  Secondly, most districts are engaged in activities that
affect the quality of life of the community; health, sanitation, school,
fire, police, transportation, utilities, etc., are services that implicate all
residents.239
Although under this analysis most special districts would not fall
within the Avery exception, there are a number, mostly in rural
areas, that would. Reclamation districts and drainage districts, like wa-
ter storage districts are land directed. 240  Their primary function is to
237. Since a tax is an "enforced contribution to provide for the support of govern-
ment" (United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)), it gives an individual
a substantial interest in the government unit being supported. As one writer observed,
taxation involves far reaching consequences:
Taxation may create monopolies or it may prevent them; it may diffuse wealth or
it may concentrate it; it may promote liberty and equality of rights, or it may
tend to the establishment of tyranny and despotism; it may be used to bring about
reforms, or it may be so laid as to aggravate existing grievances and foster dissen-
sion and hatred between classes; taxation may be so contrived by the skillful hand
as to give free scope to every opportunity for the creation of wealth or for the
advancement of all true interests of states and cities, or it may be so shaped by
ignoramuses as to place a dead weight on a community in the race for industrial
supremacy.
R. ELY, TAXATION IN AMERICAN STATES AND CITIES 55 (1888).
238. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 8-10 (1962);
ADVISORY COMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GOVERNMENTAL STRUC-
TURE, ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 15 (1961); ADVISORY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-37.
239. See note 236 supra. In an urban area, because of the complex interrelation-
ships, most of the activities of a governmental entity can be said to substantially affect
the community as a whole:
In matters of social and governmental regulation a diverse population crowded
into a small area must be differentiated from rural populations. In an urban cen-
ter the relation of the individual to the community is quite unlike his relation in
a rural section. The mere concentration of population creates a degree of inter-
dependence between the individual and the community as a whole. That is to say,
the existence of populous cities in which the sanitary conditions and ethical habits
of every householder affect every other householder has created new rights and
new duties. So it may be said that independence as hitherto understood has been
supplanted by interdependence.
6 E. McQuiLLEN, THm LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.34 (rev. vol. 1969).
240. See ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA DISTRIcr LAws (1966).
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assist owners of land engaged in agricultural pursuits, and they are not
authorized to perform services that directly affect the quality of life of
nonlandowners. Therefore, those district's engaging in these limited
functions which have Salyer-type voting schemes2 41 would appear to
meet the Avery exception.242
241. An issue still remaining to be decided is the effect of California's constitutional
prohibition against property ownership as a voter qualification: "No property qualifica-
tion shall ever be required for any person to vote or hold office." CAL. CONsT. art.
1, § 24. A number of old California cases have held that when a special district with
few or no residents makes land ownership the qualification for participation in the se-
lection process for the district's governing body, this participation constitutes a property
owner appointment rather than an election. See, e.g., Barber v. Galloway, 195 Cal.
1, 231 P. 34 (1924); Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 213 P. 983 (1923); People ex rel.
Chapman v. Sacramento Drainage Dist., 155 Cal. 373, 103 P. 207 (1909); People v.
Reclamation Dist. No. 551, 117 Cal. 114, 48 P. 1016 (1897). The continued validity of
these cases is questionable. See Burrey v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement Dist., 5
Cal. 3d 671, 677 n.6, 448 P.2d 395, 399 n.6, 97 Cal. Rptr. 203, 207 n.6 (1971). If the
courts should decide that these voting schemes were violative of the California constitu-
tional provision, a new classification could most likely be developed to overcome the
objection. Some criteria, other than property ownership, could conceivably be developed
in identifying those primarily interested in the district, and the franchise could be
accordingly restricted.
242. See notes 88 and 90 "supra. The major exception is California Water Districts,
CAL. WATER CODE ANN. H9 34000 et seq. (West 1956). These districts are organized
to acquire, construct, and maintain works for the production, storage, and distribution
of water for irrigation, domestic, industrial, and municipal purposes, and drainage or
reclamation in connection therewith. Id. § 35401. The districts may also acquire,
construct, and operate facilities for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage,
waste, and storm waters of the district Id. § 35500 (West Supp. 1974).
There are 159 of these districts, and they encompass a combined acreage of
2,749,833. ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 3. A district is governed by a board
of directors elected by the qualified voters of the district. Only landowners are entitled
to vote (CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 34027 (West 1956)) and each is entitled to one
vote for each one dollar of assessed land value (id. § 35003 (West Supp. 1974)). These
districts are located primarily in rural areas of California and provide needed services
that would otherwise be unavailable because of the absence of other governmental bod-
ies in the area.
Financial transactions of the districts indicate that they are substantially engaged
in the supply of water for other than agricultural use:
Water Sales Fiscal Year 1971-72
Residential $1,865,705
Business 331,785
Industrial 382,201
Irrigation 11,714,462
Water Services Fiscal Year 1971-72
Fire Prevention $35,458
ANNuAL REPOORT, supra note 133, at 7.
The supply of water for irrigation, domestic, industrial, and municipal purposes, and
the provision of sewer services indicate that this special district does not "disproportion-
ately affect" only landowners. All residents have a substantial interest in such serv-
ices. The constitutionality of the voting scheme in California Water Districts is argu-
ably suspect since the voter equality principles should apply.
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V. THE FUTURE OF VOTER EQUALITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Unless the Supreme Court chooses to ignore the impact that most
special-purpose districts have on all resident citizens, 43 the voter equal-
ity principles will still be applicable to most government entities. There-
fore, Salyer does not provide general support for a legislative limitation
of the franchise to interested voters of a government entity. If such
were not the case, there would be an immense danger of excluding
individuals from equal participation in the activities of government enti-
ties that substantially affect their lives. s'"
243. In Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410
U.S. 743 (1973), the Court, in a per curiamn opinion delivered the same day as Salyer,
applied the principles of that case to a Wyoming Watershed Improvement District.
The district was formed pursuant to a referendum which, under Wyoming law, was
limited to landowners. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-354.8 & -354.9 (1973). The district
sought a right of entry onto the appellants land for the purpose of undertaking studies
to determine the feasibility of constructing a dam and reservoir. Appellant resisted,
and the district brought suit. Appellant argued that the district was illegally formed
because the provision limiting the referendum to landowners violated the equal protec-
tion clause. The trial court ruled against appellant on the merits and the Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improve-
ment Dist., 490 P.2d 1069 (1971). The United States Supreme Court affirmed:
As in Salyer, we hold that the State could rationally conclude that landowners are
primarily burdened and benefited by the establishment and operation of watershed
districts and that it may condition the vote accordingly.
410 U.S. at 745. Justice Douglas again dissented, and was joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall. Since the activities of the watershed district involved the construction
of a dam, Justice Douglas concluded that important environmental issues were involved,
issues of concern to all the residents of the district:
It is... inconceivable that a body with the power to destroy a river by damming
it and so deprive a watershed of one of its salient environmental assets does not
have "sufficient impact" on the interests of people generally to invoke the princi-
ples of Avery and Hadley.
Id. at 749.
244. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 104 (1973). The
general trend of state legislation, however, is not to restrict the franchise in special
purpose district elections, but to eliminate elections by providing alternate methods of
selection of the district's governing body. Elections in special-purpose districts are gen-
erally disfavored because of the lack of voter participation:
The election of a group of local citizens to operate a special district has been
cited by many as the democratic approach, providing for a high degree of local
autonomy. However, others are of the opinion that this does not always produce
the desired "grass roots" control that it is presumed to since district government in
an urban area tends to be confusing to the citizen. In order to be a conscientious
citizen residents of some areas would have to keep up with the activities of as
many as 10 to 12 governments. Poor district voting records indicate that the aver-
age citizen has little interest in the day-to-day activities of districts, probably due
to the large number and their relatively small scale operation.
FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY
GoVERNMENT, SPECIAL DIsTRIcrs IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: PROBLEMS IN GEN-
ERAL AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF SEwER AND FIRE DisTnur AcTS 31 (Assembly In-
terim Committee Reports 1957-1959). See also ADvIsoRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra
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Nonetheless, Salyer does indicate that the Supreme Court is depar-
note 2, at 67-68; S. ScOTr & J. CoRzmt, SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO
BAY AREA: SOME PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 3 (1964).
Alternate selection techniques include appointment by the board of supervisors of
the county wherein the district is located (see, e.g., CAL. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 8501
(West 1968) (citrus pest districts); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 2240 (West
1970) (mosquito or vector control districts)); ex officio control by the board of
supervisors (see, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE App. § 28-3 (West Supp. 1974) (Los Angeles
Flood Control District); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 24220 (West 1967) (air
pollution control districts); CAL. WATER CODE App. § 51-7 (West 1968) (Santa Barbara
County Water Agency)); and a mixed county-city selection procedure (see, e.g., CAL.
PUB. UTm. CODE ANN. § 30201 (West 1973) (Southern California Rapid Transit
District); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 24352 (West Supp. 1974) (Bay Area
Air Pollution Control District); CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE § 6240 (West Supp. 1974)
(port districts)).
Local government units that utilize appointment as the means of selecting their gov-
erning body are not immune to constitutional attack on the grounds of violating voter
equality. See Nahmod, Reflections on Appointive Local Government Bodies and a
Right to an Election, 11 DUQUESNE L. Rnv. 119 (1972). California has a number
of special districts in which the governing body of the district is appointed by the vari-
ous political subdivisions within its boundaries. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UrIL. CODE ANN.
§ 30201 (West 1973) (Southern California Rapid Transit District); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 24352 (West Supp. 1974) (Bay Area Air Pollution
Control District); CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. H9 66800-01 (West Supp. 1974) (Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Compact).
A good example is the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. California and Nevada
entered into a compact, with the approval of Congress, to provide the Lake Tahoe area
with planning, conservation, and resource development. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §
66801 (West Supp. 1974). To accomplish this purpose the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency was established as a separate legal entity. Id. The governing body is selected
in the following manner:
One member appointed by each of the County Boards of Supervisors of the Coun-
ties of El Dorado and Placer and one member appointed by the City Council of
the City of South Lake Tahoe. Each member shall be a member of the city coun-
cil or county board of supervisors which he represents and, in the case of a super-
visor, shall be a resident of a county supervisorial district lying wholly or partly
within the region.
One member appointed by each of the Boards of County Commissioners of Doug-
las, Ormsby and Washoe Counties ...
One member appointed by the Governor of California and one member ap-
pointed by the Governor of Nevada ...
The Administrator of the California Resources Agency or his designee and the
Director of the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources or his
designee.
Id. The agency has the power to adopt ordinances, rules, regulations, and policies to
effectuate regional planning. Id.
In People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193,
96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971), the counties of El Dorado and Placer contended that the
method of selecting the governing body of the agency violated the "one person, one
vote" principle. The court stated that it was clear that the governing body of the
agency did not represent equal numbers of residents within the region and concluded
that "one person, one vote" was obviously violated if applicable to the manner in which
the governing body was selected. Id. at 503-04, 487 P.2d at 1208, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
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ting from the strict application of the voter equality principles. 245  In
the previous decisions of the Court, voting in all local elections received
vigorous protection. 24 6 The refusal of the Court to afford the same
protection in Salyer is a reflection of its favorable attitude toward the
concept of flexibility in the structural arrangements of government.247
This attitude is vividly elucidated in the recent state legislative reap-
portionment cases decided by the Court.248  The Court has determined
568. Relying on Sailors, the court went on to hold that the principle of "one person,
one vote" did not apply to the agency since the governing body was appointed. Id.
at 504, 487 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 569. See generally Egan v. Wisconsin State
Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 332 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Wallis v. Blue, 263 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Ga. 1967); O'Keefe v. Atascadero County
Sanitation Dist., 21 Cal. App. 3d 719, 98 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1971); Latham v. Board
of Educ., 201 N.E.2d 111 (Ill. 1964); Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. New
Jersey, 270 A.2d 418 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1970), aff'd. on other grounds, 304 A.2d 845
(N.J. 1973); Bergerman v. Lindsay, 255 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 955 (1970).
245. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Htav. L. REv. 1, 104 (1973).
246. See notes 28-82 supra and accompanying text.
247. See note 252 infra.
248. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), the Court approved a reapportion-
ment plan for the House of Delegates of the Virginia General Assembly that had a
maximum deviation from population equality of 16.4%. Id. at 319. The Court was
squarely faced with the issue of whether or not the absolute equality principles that
the Court had applied in congressional redistricting in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969) (see note 59 supra), and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) (see
note 59 supra), were applicable in the context of state legislative reapportionment. In
Conners v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972), the Court had expressly reserved decision
on this issue. Kirkpatrick and Wells dealt with congressional redistricting and were
based on the decision in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Therefore, in Mahan
the Court engaged in a comparison of the principles of Wesberry and Reynolds. The
Court noted that in Reynolds there was language suggesting that more "flexibility was
constitutionally permissible with respect to state legislative reapportionment than in
congressional redistricting." 410 U.S. at 321. Indeed, the Court noted that in state
legislative redistricting, factors such as the integrity of political boundaries and the in-
surance of some voice to its political subdivisions could be considered so long as the
overriding objective of substantial population equality was met. Id. at 322. By con-
trast, the Court stated that in Wesberry it was recognized that there was "no excuse
for the failure to meet the objective of equal representation for equal numbers of people
in congressional districting other than the practical impossibility of drawing equal dis-
tricts with mathematical precision." Id. at 322. Thus, the Court propounded:
[W]hereas population alone has been the sole criterion of constitutionality in con-
gressional redistricting under Art. I, § 2, broader latitude has been afforded the
States under the Equal Protection Clause in state legislative redistricting because of
the considerations enumerated in Reynolds v. Sims.
Id.
The Court therefore concluded that the application of the "absolute equality" test
of Kirkpatrick and Wells to state legislative reapportionment could impede the normal
functioning of state and local government entities and should not be employed. Id.
at 323. Some deviations from the equal population principle were permissible, accord-
ing to the Court, if "'based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of
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that the concept "one person, one vote" does not demand mathematical
equality when the issue is state reapportionment.24 9 The present rule
appears to be -that if the maximum deviation from population equality
is less than 10 percent no violation of equal protection is established,2I °
and deviations between 10 and 16 percent may be justified if "based
on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
a rational state policy."' Id. at 325, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579
(1964). The Court then went on to approve the Virginia plan because it could "rea-
sonably be said to advance the rational state policy of respecting the boundaries of
political subdivisions" (id. at 328) and held that 16.4% variation did not exceed
constitutional limits. Id. (The Court stated that there was no precise formula to deter-
mine the permissible range of percentage deviations. While acknowledging that 16%
"may well approach tolerable limits" it concluded that it did not exceed them. Id.
at 329.)
In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), the Court approved a reapportion-
ment plan for the House of the Connecticut General Assembly that had a maximum
deviation from population equality of 7.83%. Id. at 737. The Court held that a prima
facie violation of the equal protection clause had not been established by such a small
deviation. Id. at 741. In other words, the state need not articulate any justification
when only minor deviations from population equality are established. Id. at 745. This
conclusion, the Court stated, could be based solely on the fact that the statistical mate-
rial used in reapportionment (the United States Census) is "inherently less than abso-
lutely accurate." Id. Based on such a realization, the Court stated it "makes little
sense to conclude from relatively minor 'census population' variations among legislative
districts that any person's vote is being substantially diluted." Id. at 745-46. Further-
more, the Court pointed out that even if the census were absolutely accurate when taken,
district populations are constantly changing. Id.
Gaffney is a significant development; if only minor deviations are shown, no judicial
intervention is required or permitted. Id. at 749. Indeed, the Court strongly repri-
manded the lower federal courts for their needless interference in state reapportion-
ment:
That the Court was not deterred by the hazards of the political thicket when it
undertook to adjudicate the reapportionment cases does not mean that it should be
bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment slough, particularly when there
is little, if anything, to be accomplished by doing so.
Id. at 749-50.
In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), decided the same day as Gaffney,
the Court approved a reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representa-
tives that had a maximum deviation from population equality of 9.9%. Id. at
761. The Court, relying on Gaffney, concluded that a person was not denied "fair
and effective" representation by minor deviations in population equality among districts.
Id. at 765. Greater deviations, according to the Court, most likely would "not be tol-
erable without justification 'based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectua-
tion of a rational state policy."' Id. (emphasis added), quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 579 (1964). The Court in White did affirm the lower court's invalidation
of two multimember districts on the ground that they were designed to deny political
representation to racial minorities. Id. at 665-70. See generally Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124 (1970); Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts
and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 666 (1972); Comment, Effective Repre-
sentation and Multimember Districts, 68 MICH. L. RaV. 1577 (1970).
249. Mahanv. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323 (1973).
250. White v. Regester, 412U.S. 755, 761 (1973).
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state policy. ' '2S1 The Court has noted that to apply an absolute equal-
ity standard could interfere with the normal functioning of state and
local governments, 252 and has strongly reprimanded the lower federal
courts for needless interference in apportionment cases.2 53
CONCLUSION
In Salyer, the Court has definitively established that there are limits
251. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 325 (1973), quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 579 (1964). What considerations the present Court will deem legitimate
remains to be seen. For example, the California Legislature, although commanding
that district divisions be drawn as nearly equal to population as possible, has authorized
the Kern County Water Agency (CAL. WATER CODE App. §§ 99-1 et seq. (West 1968)),
to consider other factors as well. The factors specified include: (1) topography; (2)
geography; (3) cohesiveness, contiguity, integrity, and compactness of territory; and (5)
community of interest of divisions. Id. § 99-7.1 (West Supp. 1974). Assuming that the
voter equality principles are applicable to this district, the courts must determine
whether or not the consideration of these factors is constitutionally permissible.
252. Id. at 323. As the Court indicated in Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S.
105 (1967), if government entities are to respond to today's challenges, structural flex-
ibility is desirable: "Viable local governments may need many innovations, numerous
combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to
meet changing urban conditions." Id. at 110-11. Strict numerical application of "one
person, one vote" has been viewed as a hindrance to this needed flexibility, especially
in the area of metropolitan consolidation. See, e.g., Comment, The Impact of Voter
Equality on the Representational Structures of Local Government, 39 U. Cm. L. REv.
639, 640 (1972).
It would indeed be anomalous if a mechanical application of the voter equality prin-
ciples, which are designed to insure effective participation in government, should deny
the citizen effective and innovative government. This is especially the case in the area
of metropolitan consolidation where the "one person, one vote" principles have been
seen as a barrier to regional governments, since the suburban and rural areas that would
be least benefited by such a consolidation would generally be unwilling to subject them-
selves to it if the voter equality principles would assure urban areas, which would be
most benefited by the consolidation, the dominant voice. Id. See Leiken, Governmen-
tal Schemes for the Metropolis and the Implementation of Metropolitan Change, 49
I. URBAN L 667 (1972).
253. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 750 (1973). The Court stated that this
case was a good example of what should not happen in the federal courts. The state
had proposed a plan for the House that had a maximum variation of 7.83%. Appellees
proposed four alternate plans for the House, one of which had a maximum variation
of 2.6%. The district court appointed a master who came up with a plan for the
House that had a maximum variation of only 1.16%. Id. As the Court stated:
Was the Master compelled, as a federal constitutional matter, to come up with a
plan with smaller variations than were contained in appellees' plans? And what is
to happen to the Master's plan if a resourceful mind hits upon a plan better than
the Master's by a fraction of a percentage point? Involvements like this must end
at some point, but that point constantly recedes if those who litigate need only
produce a plan that is marginally "better" when measured against a rigid and un-
yielding population-equality standard.
The point is, that such involvements should never begin. ... . [S]tate reap-
portionment is the task of local legislatures. ...
Id. at 750-51.
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to the dilution and disenfranchisement principles by holding them inap-
plicable to a special-purpose district. In so doing, the Court has mis-
takenly combined the dilution and disenfranchisement principles by es-
tablishing the Avery test as the threshold inquiry for their applica-
bility.254 The result is the approval of a voting scheme that would be
characterized as inequitable by most persons. 255
But for the Court to strike down the voting scheme would have pro-
pelled it on a course it was unwilling to take; one which would have
been in conflict with the judicial restraint of the Burger Court and acted
as a catalyst for unlimited challenges to state and local government vot-
ing schemes in the lower federal courts. Instead, the Court distin-
guished old principles2 56 and in the process created new ones in the
hope of allowing state and local governments freedom to effectively
function.257 By "distinguishing" these principles the Burger Court has
revolutionized the constitutional philosophy surrounding the right to
vote. If the Warren era's approach could be summed up in the simple
aphorism that, "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres," ' ap-
parently the Burger Court is prepared to state that some public officials
represent acres and trees, not people.
Robert M. Myers
254. See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra.
255. Although there is no justification for the system of weighted voting (see notes
209-15 supra and accompanying text), it would appear that the restriction of the fran-
chise to landowners is constitutionally valid. See notes 186-200 supra and accompany-
ing text. This is, however, not to say that the restriction of the franchise to landown-
ers is desirable. See BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 250. But since the restriction violates
no constitutional provision, the decision to eliminate such a restriction should be made
by the legislature:
Property and poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current
egalitarian notions of how a modem democracy should be organized. It is of
course entirely fitting that legislatures should modify the law to reflect such
changes in popular attitudes.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
256. See Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation
is at War-, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 3 (1971).
257. See note 252 supra and accompanying text.
258. 377 U.S. at 562.
